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FROM BREARD TO ATKINS TO MALVO: LEGAL
INCOMPETENCY AND HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS ON THE
FRINGES OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Linda A. Malone*
In Republic of Paraguay v. Allen,' the LaGrand Case,2 and Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals,3 nations pressed their claims in U.S. courts and the World
Court that the United States is violating its treaty obligations and human rights
obligations under customary international law by failing to provide consular
notice before imposing the death penalty on their nationals. These claims proceeded
while three seemingly unrelated, but significant, developments occurred in United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence with potential importance for future cases
concerning the lack of consular notification. The first such development is the 2003
Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court concluded that the
execution of mentally retarded individuals is cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.4 The second development was the growing
receptiveness and acceptance by a majority of the Court of international law norms
in interpretation of the Bill of Rights, most notably and recently in Lawrence v.
Texas.5 Even more recently, a jury in Virginia refused to impose the death penalty
on Lee Malvo, although Virginia is one of fifteen states which still allow the death
penalty for juveniles between the ages of sixteen and eighteen.6 The United States
is one of only two countries (the other being Somalia) which has not ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child,7 which prohibits imposition of the death
* Marshall-Wythe Foundation Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law.
Professor Malone was co-counsel for Breard and for Paraguay in Republic of Paraguay v.
Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), and Breard v. Pruett, 134
F.3d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). The author gratefully acknowledges
the technical support of Della Harris and Felicia Burton, and the research assistance of
Carollyn Jackson on earlier drafts of a related paper, and of Jennifer Evans and Stephanie
Jung on sections of this Article.
134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
2 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm.
3 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128
(Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idecisions.htm.
4 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
6 See The International Justice Project, Juveniles Statistics Table (as of Mar. 2003), at
http://www.intemationaljusticeproject.org/juvStatutes.cfm (last visited Sept. 14, 2004).
7 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
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penalty on anyone under the age of eighteen, and the constitutionality of the death
penalty for juveniles is pending before the Court.!
Crucial to the Court's decision in Atkins was the Court's concern that mentally
retarded defendants could not fully comprehend the process or the punishment
in death penalty cases, 9 and lacked the moral culpability of other perpetrators.' °
Many of the same concerns are at the heart of the consular notice requirement.
The jury verdict in the Malvo case suggests that growing public rejection of the
death penalty for juveniles has outpaced the Court's decision-making, and that
international norms prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles are more reflective
of public opinion within the United States than either domestic legislation or the
Court's decisions would suggest. Atkins and Lawrence provide an evident juris-
prudential framework for abolition of the death penalty for juveniles, as well as
renewed justification for Supreme Court consideration of the necessary remedy
for the failure to provide consular notice. Finally, in light of international decisions
binding on the United States indicating that the failure to provide consular notice
violates fundamental notions of due process and necessitates judicial review, U.S.
courts can no longer deny review and reconsideration of death penalty sentences
obtained without the required consular notice.
I. BEGINNING WITH BREARD
The factual and procedural background of the Breard and Paraguay cases
has never been fully delineated. This background continues to be important for
several reasons, and merits a detailed examination. To date, these companion cases
represent the fullest examination of the issue of consular notification in U.S.
federal courts, including the Supreme Court. In addition, these early cases provide
a comprehensive overview of every major legal issue related to providing or
compelling consular notification.
Angel Francisco Breard was a Paraguayan and Argentinian dual-national who
was convicted, sentenced to the death penalty, and executed by the state of Virginia
for the crimes of rape and murder." Although his conviction was obtained on
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, at http://www.unhchr.ch/
pdf/report.pdf (June 9, 2004).
' Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 166, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989), revised by U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/
25/Corr. 1 (1996), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1457 (1989).
9 536 U.S. at 306.
10 Id. at 320-21.
" Breard was convicted of attempted rape and capital murder of Ruth Dickie, a single,
thirty-nine-year-old woman who resided alone in Arlington County, Virginia. Republic of
Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). The jury imposed the death penalty based on findings of
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sufficient evidence and he testified to committing the murder, 2 the trial proce-
dure was flawed. Breard was not provided with the opportunity to obtain consular
assistance as required by treaties between the United States and Paraguay. 3 Such
assistance would have provided him with fundamental protections essential to
due process because foreign consular officials ensure that their nationals are
provided a fair process and that their nationals understand the mechanisms of the
judicial process that they face. Without these protections, the foreign nationals are
unable to represent themselves or assist counsel adequately during their criminal
proceedings. Even if a foreign national is ultimately found guilty of the accused
crime, consular assistance is still necessary because an understanding of the criminal
proceeding can drastically affect the sentence.
Correspondingly, in the Breard case, Paraguay was denied its right to assist its
citizen while he was incarcerated in the United States. The claims of Breard and
Paraguay to establish their rights under the international treaties were at the time
relatively unique, but are now one of about a dozen instances in which states have
sought to compel fulfillment of these international obligations entered into by the
federal government of the United States.' 4
Currently, there is no accepted procedure by which a foreign country may seek
redress in United States domestic courts for violations of the Vienna Convention.
The tension between the individual states and federal government that occurs when
determining how to ensure domestic compliance with international treaties high-
lights these problems within the federalist system. The United States' dual system
of government is not recognized in international law as an excuse for noncom-
pliance with international treaties, and the continued noncompliance of the
individual states with the international obligations entered into by the federal
government must be addressed. Without some change in domestic attitudes and
policies, it is likely that noncompliance of the states with international treaties will
"vileness" and "future dangerousness" and on August 22, 1993 the trial court sentenced
Breard in accordance with the jury's verdicts. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670,
673 (Va.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994).
12 See Breard, 445 S.E.2d at 674. Conclusive evidence of Breard's pubic hair and DNA
from semen was found on Dickie's body. Breard testified that he forced his way inside
Dickie's apartment, stabbed her several times, removed her pants, and then ran away through
a kitchen window when a maintenance man, responding to the commotion, knocked on the
door. Lastly, Breard stated that on the night of the crime, he felt he was under a curse placed
on him by his ex-father-in-law.
'3 See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
'4 See, e.g., Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm; LaGrand
Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm.
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be viewed as an excuse for other countries to abdicate their treaty responsibilities
to the United States as well.
A. Vienna Convention Violations
The Vienna Convention" is an agreement between the ratifying countries as to
how certain consular relations among the nations shall be conducted. In particular,
Article 36 sets out specifications for "Communication and Contact with Nationals
of the Sending State.' 16 The treaty provides procedural safeguards similar in effect
and importance to Miranda rights. Article 36 provides:
With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State: . .. (b) if [the
national] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison,
custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authori-
ties without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-
paragraph. 17
The last sentence was the central basis for the claim that Virginia violated
international law during Breard's arrest, conviction, and sentencing. Breard
should have been informed "without delay" upon detention of his right to contact
and communicate with his consular post. Although foreign nationals are not
,s Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The treaty was ratified by the President of
the United States on November 12, 1969, and entered into force with respect to the United
States on December 24, 1969. Paraguay ratified the Vienna Convention on December 23,
1969. The treaty has been in force between the United States and Paraguay as of thirty days
after ratification. E.g., Petitioner's Brief at 7, Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp
1269 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No.
3:96CV745).
16 Vienna Convention, supra note 15, at art. 36.
17 Id. at para. 1(b) (emphasis added).
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required to use consular assistance under this provision, 8 they are guaranteed the
right to be informed of its availability. In Breard's case, he had no opportunity to
decide if he would use consular help because he was not informed of his right to
contact the consulate. Additionally, the consular officials, and thus the Republic of
Paraguay, were denied their right guaranteed under the Vienna Convention to "visit
a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse
and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation."' 9  The
authorities in Virginia violated Breard's rights under the Vienna Convention, and
simultaneously violated Paraguay and Argentina's rights under the Vienna
Convention, by not complying with the notice provision within the treaty."
Although Virginia has a right to enforce its state criminal laws, it operates
within a constitutional system that mandates deference to laws and treaties of the
federal government. In addition to its normal procedures, Virginia must, under
the Supremacy clause, make an additional effort to follow the requirements of
international agreements such as those found in the Vienna Convention. The treaty
clearly expresses:
The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said
laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended.2
Virginia was notified of this requirement through notices published and sent to
the local and state governments by the U.S. Department of State. The message
entitled "Notice: If You Have Detained a Foreign National, Read This Notice,"
dated September 1, 1991, was addressed to law enforcement personnel to inform
them of the United States' obligation under international agreements to notify
foreign authorities when foreign nationals are detained.23 In particular, the notice
," The United States does not have a specific bilateral agreement with Paraguay or
Argentina requiring them under all circumstances to notify the national's country, rather the
Vienna Convention is a multilateral agreement which gives the national the right to be
notified so that he can contact his consular officials. See id.
" Id. at para. 1(c).
20 See Vienna Convention, supra note 15. Note that Argentina did not file suit against the
United States with regard to the Vienna Convention violations.
21 Id. at para. 2 (emphasis added).
22 See Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exhibit 7, Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp.
1255 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 3:96CV366) (exhibit 7).
23 Id. An additional notice entitled "Note For Law Enforcement Officials On Detention
20041
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states that "[tihe arresting official should in all cases immediately inform the for-
eign national of his right to have his government notified concerning the arrest/
detention." '24 If such a request is made, notification to the appropriate consulate
must be made without delay.25
The notices sent to local officials by the Department of State make it clear that
state and local governments are legally bound by the requirements of this
international agreement.2 6 In fact, the obligations of such treaties could not be
carried out without the cooperation of state and local governments.
Compliance with these agreements is of utmost importance to U.S. citizens, who
must be able to depend upon reciprocal rights should they be subject to a judicial
process in another country:27 "The cooperation of state and local law enforcement
authorities is essential if the United States is to carry out its notification obligations
effectively, and to ensure that Americans arrested or detained abroad obtain the
treatment to which they are entitled."28 The treaty safeguards protect foreign
citizens from becoming targets of corrupt or poorly handled cases: "The Vienna
Convention recognizes that sovereign states, such as the Republic of Paraguay, have
an interest in protecting the life, liberty and property of their citizens abroad, and
that interest can only be safeguarded by protecting the functions of consular
officers."29
The United States has long acknowledged the importance of the rights afforded
to detained persons, and provides safeguards in its domestic justice system through
a system of guaranteed rights, such as Miranda rights.3" The rights afforded by the
Vienna Convention are similar in principle to those provided by Miranda. Consuls
are available to help maintain the integrity of the criminal procedure employed. By
informing foreign nationals of their rights under the Vienna Convention, as required
by the treaty, consular officials place a defendant in a better position to look after
Of Foreign Nationals" reiterating the obligations of the local governments and giving a
current list of phone numbers (including the countries formerly part of the USSR and
Yugoslavia) dated October 1, 1992 was also sent to local law enforcement officials.
24 id.
21 Vienna Convention, supra note 15, at art. 36, para. 1(b).
26 The United States Senate ratified the Vienna Convention on December 24, 1969, and
by doing so made it applicable to Virginia through the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution. U.S. CONST., art VI, cl. 2. See also Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
at 9, Exhibit 7A, Breard (No. 3:96CV366). For more in-depth analysis, see discussion infra
Part II.E on Federalism and International Law.
27 See Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
147, 187-88 (1999).
28 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exhibit 7A, Breard (No. 3:96CV366).
29 Petitioner's Brief at 8, Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp 1269 (E.D. Va.
1996), aff'd, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 3:96CV745).
30 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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his or her own interests, to understand the legal system confronted, and to avail
himself of protections that our justice system deems of fundamental importance.
Similar to the fears underlying the Fifth Amendment,3 a concern underlying
the consular notice requirement is that detainees may act in a particular way or
say something incriminating simply because of their cultural perceptions of the
circumstances. "A foreigner may ... be particularly vulnerable to deception used
by police detectives as a standard interrogation technique.... [A]n accused from
a country with an authoritarian government may anticipate torture or retaliation
against family members; thus, even cajoling statements by police interrogators may
evoke fear. ''32 Such detainees are "unfamiliar with U.S. customs, police policies,
and criminal proceedings."33 As is true with Miranda cases, a violation of the
Vienna Convention resulting in "lack of consular access may lead to the conviction
of a person who otherwise might be acquitted .... Apart from the question of guilt,
a lack of consular access may result in a death sentence for a person who might
otherwise be sentenced to life imprisonment. '
Overall, a violation of such fundamental procedural rights should result in an
action being declared void without a requirement of prejudice or any additional
showing.35 This argument is based on the fact that both Miranda rights and the
rights afforded by the Vienna Convention are absolute rights. The right of consular
access under the Vienna Convention is an absolute right because "[niothing in the
text of Article 36 suggests that relief for a foreign detainee should depend on
whether he can show prejudice. Moreover, requiring a showing of prejudice would
often defeat the right. '36 Because the right to consul is an absolute right embodied
"' The Miranda Court noted that police are instructed by police manuals to take the guilt
of the subject as fact during an interrogation, causing the individual to be more forthcoming
with actions or statements. Id. at 450. "Even without employing brutality, the 'third degree'
or the specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a
heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals." Id. at 455. Such
an atmosphere tends to make individuals succumb to the interrogator. Id. at 457.
32 S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's Death Row and the Right of
Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 719, 720 (1995).
33 Id.
3 Id. at 727.
" See generally Valerie Epps, Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations: Timefor Remedies, 11 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISP. RESOL. 1 (2004); Howard
S. Schiffman, Breardand Beyond: The Status of Consular Notification and Access Under the
Vienna Convention, 8 CARDOZo J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27 (2000).
36 Shank & Quigley, supra note 32, at 751. The only reported case to address Article 36
violations prior to the 1998 Breard decision by the Supreme Court was United States v.
Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979). According to Shank and Quigley, "The
Ninth Circuit's decision to apply Article 36 was consistent with the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, which requires that treaties be applied as law by federal and state
court judges. Under the Supremacy Clause, treaties represent a part of 'the Supreme Law of
the Land' and are on par with an act of Congress." Shank & Quigley, supra note 32, at 731.
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in the Vienna Convention, which aims to protect detainees from unfair procedures
and trials, a violation of this right should confer the same authority on a court to
reverse a decision as does a violation of Miranda.
B. Breard
As evidenced by the outcome of his case, the notification was not provided to
Breard before or during his trial. In this instance, not only was Breard entitled to the
integrity of a fair trial, he was also entitled to the rights guaranteed under the Vienna
Convention. These violations had a fundamental impact on the outcome of the case
because Breard was denied the safeguards the treaty would have normally placed on
the process, 37 safeguards which in his case might have prevented him from taking
the stand, admitting guilt on the stand, and allowed for evidence of a brain injury
sustained and documented only in Paraguay.
After exhausting his avenues for appeal at the state level, Breard filed for habeas
corpus relief in federal district court, with one claim for relief based on the Vienna
Convention violations. 3  Breard pointed to a series of procedural flaws that
demonstrated his need for consular assistance. 39 Despite the strong evidence against
him, and contrary to the advice of his attorney, Breard refused to accept a plea
arrangement offered by the Commonwealth. 40 Breard also admitted to the murder
and attempted rape of Dickie, again against the advice of his attorney at trial.4 He
believed that by confessing that he had performed these acts under a satanic curse
and explaining that he had since been freed from this curse by a rebirth in Jesus
Christ, he would be found not guilty.42 He was under a mistaken belief from his
own culture that this confession was how he could best obtain a lenient sentence
in the American judicial system. The district court, however, dismissed Breard's
Because the treaty creates an individual right and does not require congressional action to
be implemented, Article 36 is self-executing. Id. at 730-32. For discussions of how federal
and state courts have treated challenges based on Article 36 violations since the 1998 Breard
decision by the Supreme Court, see generally Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights
to Consular Notification and Access in the United States: What's Changed Since the
LaGrand Case?, 25 Hous. J. INT'LL. 1 (2002); Robert Iraola, Federal Criminal Prosecutions
and the Right to Consular Notification Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, 105 W.
VA. L. REV. 179 (2002).
" See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (E.D. Va. 1996), aft'd,
134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
38 See Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (E.D. Va. 1996), afd sub nom,
Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
39 Id. at 1260 (listing claims presented in the petition).
o Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Breard (No. 3:96CV366).
41 id.
42 Id. at 6-7.
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claims and held that the claim was procedurally defaulted because Breard had never
raised the issue in state court.43
After Breard' s habeas corpus petition was dismissed by the district court, Breard
filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in which
he raised the following issues: the Vienna Convention violation and whether it
was procedurally defaulted; whether he made a sufficient showing of "cause" and
"prejudice" or "a fundamental miscarriage of justice" so that his claim should not
be procedurally defaulted; and whether the death penalty was arbitrarily sought."
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Breard's habeas corpus
petition, holding that the claims under the Vienna Convention were precluded under
the principles of exhaustion and procedural default.45 In Virginia, a claim is proce-
durally barred if the petitioner could have raised a claim in the initial petition and
the facts were either "known or available" to the petitioner at the time.6 Since
Breard did not raise the issues involving the Vienna Convention in the state
proceedings, it followed that he would be barred from raising them at the federal
level.
Breard responded by arguing that he had "no reasonable basis" for asserting the
Vienna Convention until after April 1996, when the Fifth Circuit held in Faulder
v. Johnson 7 that an "arrestee's rights under the Vienna Convention were violated
when Texas officials failed to inform the arrestee of his right to contact the Canadian
Consulate."48 Furthermore, precisely because Virginia failed to advise Breard of his
rights under the Vienna Convention, he was unaware he had such rights.49 The
Court rejected this argument, concluding that because the Vienna Convention had
43 Breard, 949 F. Supp. at 1263.
44 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Breard (No. 3:96CV366). See Breard, 949 F.
Supp. 1255; Appellant's Opening Brief, Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 96-25).
4' Breard, 134 F.3d at 618-19. The court cited the principle that a state prisoner must
exhaust all available state remedies before applying for federal habeas relief. Id. at 619. This
exhaustion requirement is related to the procedural default rule because a procedural default
can occur "when a habeas petitioner fails to exhaust available state remedies and 'the court
to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the
exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred."' Id. (citing
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,735 n.1 (1991)). The Fourth Circuit also held that the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996), applied in this case because Breard filed his federal habeas petition after
the AEDPA went into effect. The specific provisions of AEDPA, however, did not affect the
final judgment. Breard, 134 F.3d at 618.
' Breard, 134 F.3d at 619 (quoting Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1354 n. 1 (4th Cir.
1996)).
47 81 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996).
4' Breard, 134 F.3d at 619.
49 Id.
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been in effect since 1969, a "reasonably diligent" search by Breard's counsel should
have discovered the treaty.50 Therefore, Breard was foreclosed from presenting any
claim that he did not raise in the state proceedings. The court found no justification
for the procedural default, ruled that Breard was not entitled to relief under the
Vienna Convention, and ultimately affirmed the district court's judgment."
Judge Butzner wrote a particularly insightful concurring opinion. 2 He first
noted the importance of the Vienna Convention and emphasized the "mandatory
and unequivocal" nature of its language.53 The judge then stated that the relevant
provisions of the Vienna Convention should be implemented before the trial when
possible.' Judge Butzner then stated:
The protections afforded by the Vienna Convention go far
beyond Breard's case. United States citizens are scattered about
the world .... Their freedom and safety are seriously endan-
gered if state officials fail to honor the Vienna Convention and
other nations follow their example. Public officials should bear
in mind that "international law is founded upon mutuality and
reciprocity .... "
*. . The importance of the Vienna Convention cannot be
overstated. It should be honored by all nations that have signed
the treaty and all states of this nation.55
Although he concurred with the procedural default theory, Judge Butzner
emphasized the importance of the Vienna Convention and mutual respect for its
implementation.
Breard submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court; the petition was subsequently combined with Paraguay's case.56 On the day
of Breard's scheduled execution, five Justices, and Justice Souter in a concurring
opinion, ruled against both Breard and Paraguay and declined to grant certiorari.57
The Court began by stating that it was clear that Breard had procedurally defaulted
'o Id. at 620 (citing Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997)). No attorney
with expertise in international law was involved in Breard's case until the habeas stage.
SI Id. The court also ruled against Breard's various other claims.
52 Id. at 621-22 (Butzner, J., concurring).
13 Id. at 622.
4 id.
5- Id. (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895) (emphasis added)).
56 Paraguay had filed suit in federal district court claiming its rights were violated under
the Vienna Convention. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1271-72
(E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
57 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1998). The Supreme Court's holding
regarding Paraguay's claims is discussed in text accompanying notes 67-125.
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his claim by not raising the claim in the state courts.58 The Court held that the
argument put forth by Breard and Paraguay that the Vienna Convention trumps the
procedural default doctrine was "plainly incorrect for two reasons." 9 First, the
Court held that it has been recognized in international law that the implementation
of a treaty is bound by the procedural rules of the forum state.' The Court then
held that under Wainwright v. Sykes, 61 the rule in the United States is "that assertions
of error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state court."'62 Since this
procedure was not followed in Breard's case, Breard could not raise a claim of a
treaty violation before the Supreme Court.63 Second, the Court asserted that the
relevant portions of the Vienna Convention had effectively been superseded under
the doctrinal "last in time" rule.' In other words, if a treaty and a congressional
statute conflict, the most recent will trump the other. Since the Vienna Convention
has been in effect since 1969, it was superceded, according to the Court, in part by
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act65 (AEDPA), which was passed
in 1996. The AEDPA states that a habeas petitioner "alleging that he is held in
violation of 'treaties of the United States' will, as a general rule, not be afforded an
evidentiary hearing if he 'has failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in
State court proceedings."66 Thus, Breard's ability to obtain relief under the Vienna
Convention was limited by the subsequently enacted statute. In doing so, the Court
ignored the longstanding rule of judicial decision that a federal statute must first be
construed to avoid any conflict with a treaty obligation under the Charming Betsy
case.67 This could easily have been done under the rather vague, generally relevant
language of the AEDPA.
The Court then asserted that it would be impossible for Breard to prove his
claim since he could not establish how the advice he would have received from
consul and the advice he received from appointed counsel would have differed. The
Court declared that such a novel claim would be barred on habeas review under
1s Id. at 375.
59 Id.
6 Id. (The court cited three of its own cases for this proposition and no international law
sources). The Court failed to recognize that the rule is in fact that how the treaty is
implemented is left to the forum state, not whether or not it is implemented. It also failed to
acknowledge the separate and additional obligation of the United States under Article 36(2):
to give full effect to the purposes of consular notification. See supra text accompanying note
21.
61 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
62 Breard, 523 U.S. at 375.
63 Id. at 375-76.
64 Id. at 376 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957)).
65 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996).
66 Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (c)(2) (1994 ed., Supp.IV)).
67 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
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Teague v. Lane,68 thus negating Breard's claim that such a fact should be disre-
garded due to the nature of the claim.69 The Court stated that Breard could not
establish that advice and assistance from the consul would have had any impact on
his conviction and sentence,7" and that the hypothetical acceptance of a plea bargain
in return for a life sentence was too speculative to meet the necessary standard of
prejudice.7
C. Paraguay's Case
1. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen 72
The Republic of Paraguay, Jorge J. Pieto, Ambassador from Paraguay, and
Jose Dos Santos, Consul General of Paraguay, filed an action in federal district
court for declaratory and injunctive relie f 3 claiming that the violations committed
"caused injury both to the Republic of Paraguay's sovereign interest in protecting
the life and liberty of its citizens abroad through its consular officers and to the
interests of plaintiffs .. .in effectively performing their consular functions."74
Paraguay sought the right to exercise effectively its consular function of protecting
and assisting Breard during his criminal proceeding in a meaningful manner,75 and
argued that vacating "Breard's conviction and sentence is... the only way Paraguay
[could] vindicate its own rights under the Treaties, and it is the real party in
interest.''16 This case was novel in that it was the first attempt by a nation to
vindicate treaty procedural rights through an action in U.S. federal court. Thus
Paraguay sought to vacate the state criminal conviction of its national who was
convicted without having been afforded the required treaty protection.77
The district court dismissed the suit based on a finding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction 78 due to the constitutional limits placed on federal courts by the
Eleventh Amendment.79 Specifically, the opinion points out that "the Eleventh
68 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
69 Breard, 523 U.S. at 377.
70 id.
71 Id. (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
7' Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 134 F.3d 622
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
71 Id. at 1271-72 (claiming violations of the Vienna Convention, the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, and of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
71 Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5, Paraguay (No. 3:96CV745).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 27.
" See Brief of Amicus Curiae Union Internationale Des Avocats at 8, Paraguay (No.
96-2770).
78 Paraguay, 949 F. Supp. at 1272.
" Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI, and observing that it prevents the court from
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Amendment bars suits by a foreign government against a state government in federal
court,"8 including a suit against a state official which in reality is a suit against a
state.8 An exception to the Eleventh Amendment, established in Ex Parte Young,
allows parties "at risk of or suffering from a violation of federally protected rights
... to enjoin the offending state officers" 82 if they can show both that (1) "they seek
a remedy for a continuing violation of federal law and (2) . . . the relief is pros-
pective." 3 The district court, however, determined that the plaintiffs had not
established an ongoing violation because the complaint did not show that the
defendants continued to deny plaintiffs access to Breard or presently hindered their
ability to give him legal assistance. The district court noted that the Paraguayan
officials currently had access to Breard and assisted in his habeas corpus petition;
thus, the state was not currently in violation of the Vienna Convention."
The district court additionally declared that it was unable to disturb the state
court's decision because the federal claim was "inextricably intertwined with the
merits of a state court judgment," which would, in effect, require the district court
to review the state court's decision.85 Even though this was the first forum in which
Paraguay sought to vindicate its rights, the court believed that such action would be
contrary to legal principles set by the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit, which
state that a district court "has no authority to disturb a state court ruling regardless
of the procedural posture of the litigants."8
Despite the fact the district court decided that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, it did make several findings in Paraguay's favor. The court determined
that treaties "have the same force as federal law,"" a district court has equitable
having "jurisdiction over actions against a state by 'Citizens of another State or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State."').
80 Id. (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)).
81 Id.
82 Id. (citing Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
83 Id. (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1986)).
I d. at 1273.
85 Id. (implicating the RookerlFeldman doctrine). The RookerlFeldman doctrine states
that a party who has lost in state court cannot turn to federal court to seek review of the state
court's decision because the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over state
court decisions which involve federal law. Claims are not barred, however, when a plaintiff
has not been involved in the state action, but is seeking redress for the claim for the first
time. See Plaintiffs-Appellant's Brief at 23, Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 96-2770) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Johnson v.
De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)).
86 Paraguay, 949 F. Supp. at 1273. The principle behind this rule is that the Supreme
Court is to have appellate authority over such actions.
87 Id. at 1274 (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 668 (1992)).
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authority to remedy treaty violations,88 and Paraguay, as a party to the treaty, had
standing to sue for the violations.89 Furthermore, Paraguay was not a third-party
seeking to assert the rights of Breard; 9' the Consul General was a "person" within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and was therefore a proper plaintiff;91 and finally,
the issues were determined not to be moot, but suitable for declaratory relief.
92
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision, claiming that they sought
only prospective injunctive relief to stop any further action based on Breard's
unlawful conviction. 93 The plaintiffs-appellants asserted that access after Breard had
already been arrested, arraigned, tried, and sentenced was ineffective and did not
give effect to Paraguay's ongoing, violated treaty rights. 94 The appellants further
argued that consular assistance is to be given at a time when it will be effective, 95
but that they did not have access when assistance could have meaningfully
affected the outcome because the trial and conviction had already occurred. 96 "In
the most fundamental sense, so long as defendants continue to detain Breard and
to take steps to carry out a death sentence rendered without permitting the
notification and access to which Paraguay is entitled, defendants continue to
violate Paraguay's [treaty] rights." 97
The appellants also stated that the district court had original jurisdiction over
their suit because Paraguay had no habeas remedy, was not a party to the state
action, and therefore did not seek review of any ruling by the state court.98
Additionally, the appellants argued that federal district courts have original
jurisdiction over cases involving treaties, 99 and have the authority to grant an
injunction against further action which enforces a state court's ruling, if that
ruling was issued in violation of federal law.'° Lastly, the appellants argued that
88 id.
89 Id.
'o Id. The district court held the Vienna Convention was not self-executing in the sense
of conferring private rights of action for individuals; therefore, according to the district court,
Breard could not sue for violations of the Vienna Convention, but Paraguay could because
Paraguay is a party to the treaty. Id.
"1 Id. at 1275.
92 Id.
9' See Plaintiffs-Appellant's Brief at 12, Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 96-2770).
94 Id. at 16-17.
95 Id. at 20.
96 Id.
97 id.
98 ld. at 21.
99 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which vests original jurisdiction in the district courts of
cases involving treaties).
o Id. at 22.
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because their action was the first attempt to remedy the violations Paraguay
suffered, the Rooker/Feldman doctrine should not act as a bar to their claims.'0 '
Amicus briefs were filed in support of both sides. The Union Internationale des
Avocats amicus brief expressed its view that the only remedy for the violations
would be to declare Breard's conviction void. 2 The Union Internationale des
Avocats argued that the jurisdictional question should not have been used to analyze
the available remedy before the district court had determined whether the case
should succeed on the merits. 1 3 If Paraguay succeeded on the merits, then the court
could at that time structure a proper equitable remedy." 4
The United States filed an amicus brief supporting dismissal of the action
asserting that the claims were nonjusticiable under the "political question" doctrine
or, in the alternative, that Paraguay did not have a cause of action.'° 5 The United
States argued that the treaty violations "are issues of a diplomatic and political
nature regardless of which kind of official has committed the violation."'06 The
United States agreed that the primary issue at stake was how to remedy effectively
the violations which Paraguay suffered; however, it believed that this deter-
mination is to be made by the executive branch when the dispute is not personal
in nature. 0 7 The United States also argued that the political branches of the federal
government, not the individual states, deal with foreign nations.'
The United States claimed that Paraguay had no cause of action under federal
law because "neither an Act of Congress nor the Vienna Convention provides for
'o' Id. at 25. See note 85 supra for an explanation of the Rooker/Feldman doctrine.
,02 See Brief for Amicus Curiae Union Internationale Des Avocats at 8, Republic of
Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 96-2770).
103 Id. at 9.
'04 Id. The Eleventh Amendment bar posed no threat to such a remedy since Paraguay did
not seek money damages, and the Eleventh Amendment was not a barrier to equitable relief
sought to bring state authorities into compliance with the law. See generally id. (citing Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)). Note that the
Eleventh Amendment bar is intended to prevent depletion of treasury funds from monetary
remedies based on past federal violations. Paraguay's case is not barred since it is squarely
within the longstanding tradition, supported by innumerable holdings, of recognizing that the
Eleventh Amendment interposes no barrier to a federal court's use of injunctions and other
remedies to bring state authorities into compliance with the law." Id. at 9-10. (citing Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
105 Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at 2, Paraguay (No. 96-2770).
'06 Id. at 15.
107 id.
10 Id. The United States' brief suggested diplomatic alternatives for Paraguay: (1) to make
a formal diplomatic request to the State Department to take measures to remedy the violation,
or (2) to declare the United States to be in breach of a treaty and then take action to suspend
all or part of the treaty or to repudiate it. Simply stated, the United States took the position
that the correct avenue for redress was not through the judiciary. Id. at 22-23.
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the treaty's enforcement in domestic courts."' 9 Additionally, the brief argued that
the § 1983 claim was also properly dismissed because its definition of persons has
not been extended to nations, 110 and the action is based upon Paraguay's rights, not
any individual's rights."'I
In response, the appellants stated that the judiciary has the responsibility for
ensuring that states respect and comply with treaty obligations, and the United
States' brief failed to demonstrate that Article 1II courts lack authority to hear such
issues."'2 The Supremacy Clause and Article I give the judiciary the power to hear
cases arising under treaties, and the judiciary is not only competent, but is required
to address these issues. The appellants also argued that Paraguay had stated a valid
cause of action"3 because "the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action
for injunctive relief against state officers who are threatening to violate the federal
constitution or laws."" 4 Paraguay had stated a federal cause of action under the
Supremacy Clause based on a treaty violation and therefore was entitled to sue for
injunctive relief." 5
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Paraguay. Addressing only
the Eleventh Amendment ground for dismissal,"t6 the court held that the treaty
violation was not an "ongoing" violation of federal treaty law, and that the "relief
sought was not prospective."'"7 The court found that the violation was not ongoing
because Virginia was allowing Paraguay access to Breard at the time of the filing
"o Id. at 25. The United States argued that Congress needs to create an express statutory
measure to provide for the Vienna rights Convention before such causes of action under
federal law can arise. Id.
o Id. at 27-28.
I' d. at 28-30. The United States' brief argued that the court did not need to consider
Eleventh Amendment immunity or the application of the Ex Parte Young doctrine because
the case already required dismissal; the issue was nonjusticiable, and a cause of action could
not be stated under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 30-32.
112 Plaintiffs-Appellants' Reply Brief at 9-13, Paraguay (No. 96-2770).
113 id. at 22-25.
"' Id. at 23 (quoting Burgio & Compofelice, Inc. v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Labor, 107 F.3d
1000, 1006 (2d Cir. 1997)).
"' Id. at 22-23. The appellants' brief also quoted the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 reporters' note 4 (1987), which states that
when it is necessary "foreign governments and officials... may sue to enjoin or to undo
violations" of rights granted them under international law. Id. at 13. Thus, when foreign
nations raise treaty violations in United States domestic courts no "political question" is at
issue. The brief also lists and gives factual scenarios for several cases which state this
principle. See id. at 13-15. The appellants additionally distinguished the five categories of
"political question" cases established in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13, 217 (1962),
from this case. See id. at 21-22.
16 Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622,626 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371
(1998).
"7 Id. at 627.
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of the suit, and the state was not presently violating Paraguay's rights."18 The court
also denied that the treaty violations were prospective, stating that even though the
requested action "could be effectuated in an injunctive or declaratory decree directed
at state officials [this did] not alter the inescapable fact that its effect would be to
undo accomplished state action and not to provide prospective relief against the
continuation of the past violation."" 9 The appellate court emphasized its "disen-
chantment" with Virginia's "past" violations of the treaty rights of Paraguay 2 ° and
noted the potentially serious implications for U.S. interests. 2 ' The court, however,
held that these concerns could not overrule the Eleventh Amendment's protections
of states against federal court actions for past violations. 1
22
With respect to Paraguay's suit, the Supreme Court held that "neither the text
nor the history of the Vienna Convention clearly provides a foreign nation a private
right of action in United States' courts to set aside a criminal conviction and
sentence for violation of consular notification provisions. "123 In addition, the Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment also prevented Paraguay's suit against Virginia,
as Virginia is immune from suits brought against it by a foreign state absent its
consent.22 The Court then held that the "failure to notify the Paraguayan Consul
occurred long ago and has no continuing effect."' 25
The Court also rejected the § 1983 claim raised by Paraguay's Consul General,
finding that because he was acting in his official capacity, there was no difference
between him as an individual and the Republic of Paraguay.2 6 A nation is not a
"person" within the standing requirements of § 1983 and is, according to the Court,
precluded from bringing such an action. 27
"' Id. at 628. The Court distinguished the case from Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265
(1986), and Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), noting that these two cases involved
examples of officials who were in violation of federal law when the suit was filed, whereas,
in this case Paraguay officials had access to Breard at the time the suit under consideration
was filed.
" Paraguay, 134 F.3d at 628. As its only support, the court cited Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). Coeur d'Alene Tribe held that a claim to enjoin state
officials from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over lands claimed by the tribe was barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. The court did not go into the rationale of its statements and
merely rendered its decision in short, conclusory terms. Paraguay, 134 F.3d at 628-29.
12o Paraguay, 134 F.3d at 629.
2id. at 629 n.7. These same concerns were enumerated by Judge Butzner in his
concurrence in Breard v. Prueu, 134 F.3d at 621-22.
122 Breard, 134 F.3d at 629.
123 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998).
124 Id. (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934)).
125 Id. at 378.
126 id.
127 id.
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The Court concluded by chastising the applicants for not bringing the action
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) earlier. 2 ' The Court noted that the
U.S. Secretary of State had sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia requesting that
he stay the execution while the diplomatic discussion with Paraguay continued.'29
The Court, however, stated that while this was a legitimate alternative avenue to
pursue, it did not have the authority to make the decision for the governor.13
Justices Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg dissented, stating that the Court at
the least should have taken more time to consider the arguments.' Specifically,
Stevens noted that Virginia's decision to set a relatively early date for execution
deprived the Court of "the normal time for considered deliberation."' 32 Breyer
thought more consideration should have been given to Breard's arguments that
the novelty of the Vienna Convention constituted "cause," and his isolation from
consular officials "prejudiced" him by not allowing the officials to advise him
to accept a plea bargain. 33 Both Stevens and Breyer also contended that the
"international aspects" of the case provided additional reasons for a stay of
execution. "
2. Paraguay v. United States
On April 3, 1998, the Republic of Paraguay also instituted proceedings in the
ICJ against the United States for the violations of the Vienna Convention occurring
in Breard's criminal case. 3 ' In its application, Paraguay requested "restitutio in
integrum: the re-establishment of the situation that existed before the United States
failed to provide the notifications and permit the consular assistance required by the
Convention."'136 The remedy requested that any criminal liability imposed on Breard
in violation of international law be voided and that the United States guarantee the
non-repetition of the illegal acts. 13 In the interim, Paraguay requested provisional
128 id.
129 Id. (Stevens, J., Breyer, J., & Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
130 Id.
'3' Id. at 379-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 379.
131 Id. at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 380-81 (Stevens, J., & Breyer, J., dissenting).
13' Application of the Republic of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.), I.C.J. (Apr. 3, 1998), at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketlipaus/ipausframe.htm. Paraguay established
jurisdiction pursuant to Article I of the Vienna Convention's Optional Protocol. Id. at para.
22. It asserted that the United States violated a number of its international legal obligations
under the Vienna Convention, including the requirement to notify arrested nationals of the
right to consular assistance and to ensure that municipal law enables the United States to give
full effect to the rights under the Convention. Id. at para. 24.
136 Id. at para. 4.
' Id. at para. 25.
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measures of protection to ensure that Breard would not be executed before the ICJ
had the opportunity to resolve the dispute.
138
In oral arguments on whether the interim measure should be granted, the United
States argued that even if the ICJ had jurisdiction, a violation of Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention did not require a reversal of conviction. The United States
maintained that no dispute existed over the interpretation or application of the
Convention, 139 characterizing Paraguay's claim as whether the Vienna Convention
required a new trial when a violation of Article 36 occurred, which would be sepa-
rate from the "interpretation or application" of Article 36.' 40 In response, Paraguay
cited an argument made previously by the United States in a case it brought before
the ICJ, "that an allegation of a failure to comply with Article 36, and a resulting
dispute over what remedies should follow, was within the [ICJ]'s jurisdiction."'41
Although the United States acknowledged that it had violated Article 36 in
Breard's case, it contended that the violation did not require a reversal of his
conviction. Indeed, the United States disputed Paraguay's assertion that interna-
tional law requires a state, which violates an obligation to restore the situation as it
previously existed, which, in this case, would entail reversal of the conviction.
4 2
The United States maintained that consular assistance is not "an essential element
of the host country's criminal justice system," since consuls have no obligation
to assist their own nationals and may provide little assistance in a given case.
43
Additionally, the United States argued that a judicial remedy was not appropriate
because a court could not determine whether consular assistance would have
prevented Breard's conviction,' and that Breard had not been prejudiced by the
violation because he had been represented by competent counsel, was assisted by
his relatives in Paraguay, had lived in the United States for six years, and spoke
English well.4 5
138 id. at para. 28.
'3 S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Obligations to Foreign Nationals Accused of Crime
in the United States: A Failure of Enforcement, 9 CRIM. L.F. 99, 104 (1998).
'40 id.
' Id. at 106 (citing Memorial of the United States (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings
(United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran) 143 (Jan. 15, 1980)). While
Paraguay made the same jurisdictional argument that the United States had made in the
Tehran hostages case, the United States reversed its previously held position and argued that
Paraguay did not have standing before the ICJ.
142 Id.
143 Id.
l4 Id.
145 Id.at 109-10(citing International Court of Justice Verbatim Record,Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (Para. V. U.S.), 1998 Hearing on Requests for Provisional Measures,
I.C.J. Doc. Cr. 9817, at para. 2.24 (Apr. 7, 1998), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket
/ipaus/ipausframe.htm). The United States actually contradicted its position in U.S. courts
by suggesting that a requirement of demonstrating prejudice would be inappropriate.
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Moreover, the United States pointed to the text of the Vienna Convention and
its drafting process to suggest that imposing notification requirements in all cases
was understood as overly burdensome to the states, 46 and the treaty drafters did not
intend for Article 36 to infringe on domestic criminal processes by requiring a
reversal of conviction to remedy its violation 47 The United States indicated that
state practice suggests that reversal of a conviction is not required, based on an
informal survey by the State Department which failed to identify any case in
which any state's court reversed a conviction because of an Article 36 violation.
Instead, the informal survey indicated that an apology and a promise to improve
future compliance would be the usual consequences of an Article 36 violation. 4
Paraguay responded to these arguments by emphasizing the "background norm
in . . . state responsibility that requires restoration of [a] previously existing
situation" when a nation violates its international legal obligations. 49 Pointing again
to the Tehran hostages decision of the ICJ, in which the ICJ fashioned a remedy to
address a breach of the Vienna Convention even though the Convention itself did
not specify the remedies sought by the United States, Paraguay argued that it is
irrelevant that the Convention does not specify a judicial remedy. 5' Paraguay then
argued that statements made in the drafting process, as objections to the text of
Article 36, calling the proposed text "an inappropriate override of domestic criminal
procedural norms" are not interpretations of the Article's meaning." ' In rejecting
those objections and adopting the text, Paraguay argued that the drafters "manifested
an intent that domestic criminal procedural norms be overridden to ensure consular
access."'
152
The ICJ agreed with Paraguay's assessment of the drafting history, finding that
the drafters intended Article 36 to require domestic procedures to give full effect to
the right of consular access. 5 3 The ICJ also found the drafting history consistent
with the expectation that a violation would require the typical treaty law remedy,
i.e., the restoration of the status quo ante.154 As Paraguay had argued, the ICJ found
that treaties operate against the background norms of state responsibility. Thus, a
violation of Article 36 would require the United States to restore the prior existing
situation and set aside Breard's conviction. 55
46 Id. at 110.
'47 Id. at 107.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
"' Id. at 108.
152 id.
153 id.
4 Id. at 109.
'5- Id. (citing Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth
Session 6 May-26 July 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 142, U.N. Doc.
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The ICJ also suggested that a requirement of a showing of prejudice would
not be feasible or consistent with the concept of consular protection. According to
the ICJ, the Vienna Convention presumes the need for consular assistance, and
a domestic court may not require a showing of prejudice or substitute its internal
procedures, such as the provision of a court-appointed attorney, for Article 36
protections. 156
The ICJ granted Paraguay's request for interim measures by indicating that
"[t]he United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that. .. Breard
is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform
the Court of all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this Order."' 157
Virginia, however, proceeded with Breard's execution five days later on April 14,
1998. Although both the Legal Adviser to the State Department and the Secretary
of State asked the Governor of Virginia to give consideration to the ICJ's order in
his clemency decision, neither suggested that he had a legal obligation to postpone
the execution pursuant to the ICJ's order.' In a Supreme Court brief filed on
April 13, 1998, however, the Solicitor General, the Legal Adviser, and attorneys in
the Justice Department took the position that the interim order of the ICJ was not
binding on the United States and that the Vienna Convention imposed no obli-
gation to reverse Breard's conviction. ' 9 First, they argued that Article 94 of the
United Nations Charter and Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, which established the powers of the ICJ, make interim orders non-binding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General maintained that the ICJ did not consider interim
orders to be binding,"6 but even if the ICJ generally deems interim orders to be
binding, the court did not deem this order to be binding.'
61
Paraguay eventually withdrew its case on the merits from the ICJ, but only after
the United States issued a public apology for the Vienna Convention violations.'62
In a letter to the Court, Paraguay informed the ICJ that it wished to discontinue the
proceedings with prejudice and requested that the case be removed from the
A/51/10 (1996)).
156 Id. at 110-11.
' Id. at 111 (quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 248, para. 41 (Apr. 9) (order granting Paraguay's request for indication of provisional
measures). To issue interim measures, the Court must satisfy itself that it may have
jurisdiction and that Paraguay may have a meritorious case.
1' Id. at 112 (citing Brooke A. Masters, Albright Urges Virginia to Delay Execution,
WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1998, at B1).
"9 Id. at 112-13.
'60 Id. at 115-16.
161 Id. at 116.
162 See Mark Warren, Death, Dissent and Diplomacy: The U.S. Death Penalty as an
Obstacle to Foreign Relations, 13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 309 (2004).
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docket. 163 Upon the United States' concurrence, the ICJ removed the case from the
list.
164
D. LaGrand and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Treaty Non-
compliance Continues
The LaGrand Case, filed by Germany with respect to two German nationals
on death row, presented the ICJ with similar ongoing Vienna Convention violations
by the United States three years after Breard.165 In its application, Germany argued
that the United States violated its obligations under the Vienna Convention when
the state of Arizona failed to notify two arrested German nationals, Karl and
Walter LaGrand, of their right to consular assistance." Germany contended that
"the failure to provide the required notification precluded it from protecting its
nationals' interest in the United States at both the trial and the appeal level in State
courts."'67  It maintained that the United States violated its obligation under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention "to ensure that its national law[s] and
regulations enable full effect to be given to the purposes of the rights accorded
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.""' s Moreover, pursuant to Article 27
of the Vienna Convention and customary international law, Germany claimed
that the United States "[could] not derogate from its international legal obligation
to uphold the Vienna Convention based upon its municipal law doctrines and
rules."'69
163 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 10)
(order on request for discontinuance), available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocketl
ipaus/ipausorder/ipaus-iorder._9811 10.htm.
164 id.
165 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), available athttp://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/decisions.htm. The ICJ had jurisdiction under Article I of the Vienna
Convention's Optional Protocol, in which both Germany and the United States agreed
"[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice." Id. at para. 36 (quoting
Article I of the Optional Protocol).
"s Id. at para. 10. The LaGrand brothers were convicted of the murder of a bank manager
during a robbery attempt in 1982. Id. at para. 14.
167 Press Release, International Court of Justice, Germany Brings a Case Against the
United States of America and Requests the Indication of Provisional Measures (Mar. 2,
1999), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/iPressl999/ipresscom9907_ 19990302.
htm.
168 Application Instituting Proceedings (F.R.G. v. U.S.), LaGrand Case (Mar. 2, 1999),
para. 14, at http:/www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketigus/igusapplication/igus-iapplication-
19990302.htm.
169 id.
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As for remedies, Germany asked that the criminal liability imposed on the
LaGrands be voided, that the United States provide reparation for the execution
of Karl LaGrand, and that the United States restore the status quo ante in Walter
LaGrand's case. 7° Furthermore, Germany wanted the court to adjudge and declare
"that the United States is under an international legal obligation not to apply the
doctrine of 'procedural default' or any other doctrine of national law, so as to pre-
clude the exercise of the rights accorded under Article 36."' In addition, Germany
argued that "the United States should provide Germany with a guarantee of the
non-repetition of the illegal acts."'
7 2
Germany also requested interim measures of protection (provisional measures)
because of the extreme urgency of the situation and to ensure that Walter LaGrand
would not be executed pending the final decision in the international proceedings.'73
Responding to the urgency of the matter, the ICJ indicated provisional measures
without other proceedings for the first time in its history.174 It indicated that the
United States "should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand
[was] not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should
inform the [ICJ] of all the measures which it [had] taken in implementation of this
170 Id. at para. 15.
171 Id.
172 Id. The LaGrands claimed that there were Vienna Convention violations in the federal
habeas corpus proceedings after German consular officers became aware of their case in
1992. Id. at para. 4. However, the federal courts rejected their claims based on the doctrine
of procedural default, i.e., that the LaGrands were precluded from asserting Vienna
Convention claims because they had failed to raise them in the initial state proceedings. Id.
at para. 7. Likewise, Breard was barred from raising Vienna Convention violations in the
federal appeals process because of the procedural default rule. See supra note 79.
173 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3) (order on the request for the
indication of provisional measures), available at http:l/www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/
idocket/igus/igusorder/igusiorder_19990303.htm. Walter LaGrand was scheduled to be
executed on March 3, 1999. Id. at para. 8. Germany filed its application with the ICJ on
March 2, 1999. Id. at para. 6. Walter's brother Karl LaGrand was executed on February 24th,
1999, despite his appeals for clemency and diplomatic intervention by the German
government. Id. at para. 8. In its request for provisional measures, Germany argued such
measures were necessary to protect the life of Germany's national. Id. Without indication of
provisional measures, Germany would be "forever deprived of the opportunity to have [the]
status quo ante restored" if the ICJ decided in favor of Germany on the merits. Id. The
representative of the United States objected to the procedure, requested at such a late date,
because it would result in the ICJ issuing an order without having first heard the two parties.
Id. at para. 12.
171 Id. at para. 29. The ICJ observed that Germany did not become fully aware of the facts
of the case until February 24, 1999, and that Germany had immediately pursued its action
at a diplomatic level. Id. at para. 20. Furthermore, the ICJ noted that provisional measures
were justified to preserve the rights of the parties from irreparable harm pending resolution
of the dispute. Id. at para. 22.
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Order."'' 5 Despite the order, Arizona authorities executed Walter LaGrand on
March 3, 1999.
On June 27, 2001, the ICJ held on the merits that the United States breached
its obligation to the LaGrand brothers and to Germany under Article 36, paragraph
1, of the Vienna Convention by not informing either of the commencement of
criminal proceedings and the right to contact diplomatic personnel.' 76 The ICJ
further held that the refusal to review the convictions was a separate violation.'77
The ICJ held that a third violation occurred when the United States did not act
forcefully enough to prevent the execution of Walter LaGrand in accordance with
the provisional order. 7 8 This decision was the first time the ICJ ruled that a
provisional order issued under its authority was binding on participating nations.
As analyzed elsewhere in this issue, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
has also addressed the lack of consular access in death penalty cases. As discussed
by John Quigley, the Inter-American Court has found the imposition of the death
penalty to be an arbitrary deprivation of life when the right to consular notification
and access has been denied. 79 The Inter-American Court has also suggested that the
appropriate remedy for consular access and notification violations is a new trial.'
E. Federalism and International Law
The notion of pacta sunt servanda - treaties are binding and must be observed
- prevails over conflicting domestic law as a form of customary international law
known as jus cogens.L'8 Once treaties are signed and ratified, they impart an
international obligation on the parties regardless of domestic law provisions.8 2 A
self-executing treaty is one that does not require any additional legislation in order
for it to enter into effect, such as the Vienna Convention on Treaties. 3 A non-self-
executing treaty is one that requires domestic legislation to be passed in order for the
obligations under the treaty to be enforceable in domestic courts.' The recent trend
in the Senate is to interpret human rights treaties as non-self-executing, therefore
necessitating implementation by Congress before the treaty rights and responsi-
Id. at para. 29.
176 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/ icjwww/idocketligus/igusjudgment/igusjijudgment-20010625.htm.
177 id.
178 Id.
' John Quigley, Suppressing the Incriminating Statements of Foreigners, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 339 (2004).
18s Id.
181 Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406, 424
(1989).
182 id.
183 Id.
194 Id.
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bilities are enforceable in the United States. s85 The guaranteed rights of the Vienna
Convention establish a requirement of immediate protection of the individual.
Because the treaty creates an immediate, concrete, individual right, Article 36 is
self-executing and does not require congressional action to be implemented.
186
Self-executing treaties are more problematic in a federalist system because inter-
national obligations are imposed although Congress, the Judiciary, and/or the
Executive Branch may fail to take the necessary steps to ensure compliance or to
ensure compliance by the states. This obligation/compliance dichotomy is most
complicated when state cooperation is necessary for compliance.
International treaties are held on par with federal legislation under U.S. domestic
law, and can therefore trump conflicting state law under the Supremacy Clause." 7
Although the Supremacy Clause gives great leeway to Congress as to how it can
legislate state conduct, including allowing for the preemption of state laws, the
federal government cannot compel or require states to bear the burden of implement-
ing federal legislation. 8 In order for the federal government to implement treaty
obligations, the federal government can impose considerable pressure on states to
comply.
Recent decisions of the Court restricting the federal power over states suggest
that the Court will be inclined to continue its unreceptive approach to more
extensive remedies for non-compliance with these international obligations. The
discrepancy which occurs when the United States ratifies an international treaty,
but does not implement it domestically, is analogous to the situation which arises
when the federal government has legislated in an area, but cannot force states to use
their own resources to enact or uphold that law. Both of these situations create
obligations on the part of the federal government that it cannot always sustain as a
practical matter within the federalist framework.'89
"85 Id. at 425. This bifurcation stems from Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314
(1829).
116 See Shank & Quigley, supra note 32, at 730-32 (supporting the Ninth Circuit's opinion
in United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979)). See also John Quigley,
The Law of State Responsibility and the Right to ConsularAccess, 11 WILLAMETrE J. INT'L
L. & Disp. RESOL. 39 (2004); Luna & Sylvester, supra note 27. For a discussion of
arguments for and against the finding that Article 36 is self-executing, see Schiffman, supra
note 35.
187 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
18' New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp 789, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affid, 179 F.3d 29
(2nd Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1115 (2000). The Supreme Court has asserted this
dividing line in federalism in other cases, including Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
925 (1997), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995). See also Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (an example of federal preemption of
conflicting state law).
"" For additional discussion of Article 36 and the tension that the federalist system creates
in assuring compliance by the states, see generally Quigley, supra note 179.
20041
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
F. Repercussions and Future Trends
Notwithstanding a federalist system in which the states and the federal
government may in some instances differ in their compliance with treaty obliga-
tions, under international law the United States federal government "ultimately
bears the responsibility to the foreign power aggrieved by the state's actions [or lack
thereof]."' 90 The United States will, among other repercussions, be in violation of
Article 94(1) of the UN Charter, which requires that all members give full effect to
any rulings of the ICJ to which they are a party.' 9 ' It is no longer sufficient (if it
ever was) for the United States to apologize for the lack of Vienna Convention
adherence." There is no value left in the United States' acknowledgment alone of
its obligations in the face of ongoing violations at the federal or state level. Other
nations have acknowledged that either the United States is not doing all it can to
ensure compliance, or there is insufficient control of the federal government over
the states to assure compliance with the Convention. If the United States wants to
preserve the Vienna Convention rights for its own citizens, it must do so for foreign
nationals under its own jurisdiction. Mark Warren points out in his article that the
"ambivalent response of the State Department to the case of Paraguayan national
Angel Francisco Breard had lasting foreign relations consequences."' 93 Warren also
notes that the U.S. Secretary of State was aware of these lasting consequences as
early as Breard, and told the governor of Virginia that the United States would
appear to be denying the significance of international law if Breard was executed,
which in turn may "limit [the United States'] ability to ensure that Americans are
protected... abroad."' ' The United States is creating an unnecessary international
problem for itself and its citizens by being a proponent of Vienna Convention rights
when its citizens are necessitous of their protections (such as during the detention
of American citizens in Syria and Iran), yet doing little to protect the citizens of
other nations within its own borders. 9 '
190 Gregory Dean Gisvold, Strangers in a Strange Land: Assessing the Fate of Foreign
Nationals Arrested in the United States by State and Local Authorities, 78 MINN. L. REv.
771, 796 (1994).
191 Henry J. Richardson III, The Execution ofAngel Breard by the United States: Violating
an Order of the International Court of Justice, 12 TEMP. INT'L&COMP. L.J. 121, 127 (1998).
19' Id. at 124.
193 Warren, supra note 162, at 328. See generally Schiffman, supra note 35; Luna &
Sylvester, supra note 27.
194 Warren, supra note 162, at 328 (quoting Letter from Madeline Albright, Secretary of
State, to James Gilmore, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998)).
195 William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 257, 270-71 (1998).
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First, the domestic courts of the United States should interpret their own
procedural rules in order to assure full consideration of international procedural
protections, and interpret domestic procedural requirements to avoid a conflict with
international obligations if at all possible. At a minimum in Breard, the Supreme
Court could have issued a stay of execution, binding on the courts of Virginia, so
that it could have examined more fully the petitions before it. In his dissent, Justice
Stevens noted that the Court did not even use the nine days it is allowed to
deliberate because the date of execution was set too close to when the Supreme
Court heard the case.
1 96
Second, the United States can take more active steps to ensure that all federal
and state officials understand what is necessary to implement Article 36 rights. The
United States has already provided State Department notices to local officials and
given them wallet cards detailing the relevant provisions of the Vienna Con-
vention.' 97 While providing information to enforcement authorities alone does not
remedy current Vienna Convention violations, it may decrease the number of future
violations. Additionally, states could be asked to participate in a voluntary program
to report the number of foreign nationals imprisoned each year. Alternatively,
federal employees could be delegated this task, thus removing any imposition of the
federal government upon the states.
Third, federal funding could be withheld from those states that do not adhere to
these international obligations of the United States. This technique is used
commonly by Congress in domestic matters, usually under the auspices of the
Commerce Clause. There are problems with this approach, including the possibility
of states preferring the death penalty and perceived individual states' rights than to
receipt of federal funding. Additionally, this technique would raise questions as to
how the legislative branch should determine which treaties should trigger financial
restrictions imposed by the federal government.
Most importantly, the United States must abandon its vigorous defense of its
failures to comply with the Vienna Convention and redirect the intensity of that
effort into ensuring compliance. The litigation stance of the United States in
domestic courts and the ICJ has been to acknowledge that the treaty has been
violated, yet to refuse to acknowledge any consequences for that violation or accept
any remedial responsibility - even to the point of asserting that a foreign state
cannot sue in U.S. courts for an admitted violation of a ratified treaty by the United
States. Consular notice is a minimally burdensome procedural requirement with
significant, far-reaching, and difficult to rectify consequences for the individual
and U.S. international relations. It is unequivocally in the best interests of the
196 See Richardson, supra note 191, at 126.
'9' See Aceves, supra note 195, at 274-75. See generally Iraola, supra note 36 (discussing
the regulations implemented by the Department of Justice and the guidance provided by the
Department of State).
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United States and its citizens to enforce the Vienna Convention safeguards as
vigorously as they have thus far been contested. To give just one example, there is
no mention in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure of the consular notice
requirement. Amendment of the rules to include the notice requirement would at
least ensure that federal law enforcement officers were on full notice that there
must be compliance. 98
It is undisputed that heinous crimes were committed by many of the foreign
nationals raising a Vienna Convention claim to reverse their convictions and
sentences. While there is understandably little sympathy for the perpetrators of
the crimes, our own court system must observe the rule of law and all of the laws to
which the United States has agreed to be bound, if the same protection is to be
expected for U.S. nationals abroad. These are only a few suggestions which, if
implemented, could work to adjust the federalist system to effectuate the rights
provided under the Vienna Convention. Notwithstanding any domestic law issues,
the international community will hold the federal government liable for the actions
of other entities with government powers."9 Nearly ten years after Breard, it has
become imperative that a workable solution be found.
The ramifications of noncompliance with treaties providing such funda-
mental rights can lead to disastrous results for U.S. citizens. If the United States, a
dominant world influence, continues to ignore its obligations under the Vienna
Convention, other countries may begin to do the same, in effect denying Americans
their right to consular assistance when detained in a foreign country. 2°° The United
States' compliance with these international treaties is critical because when it fails
to satisfy its obligations, its highly visible example encourages similar conduct
by other countries bound by the treaty.20' Because more than 130 nations have
accepted the Vienna Convention, the consequences internationally would be
disastrous if other nations began to disregard these agreed-upon rights.2 2 To uphold
the integrity of international law and to safeguard the interests of its own citizens,
the United States federal government must do everything within its constitutional
power to require states to comply with the Vienna Convention requirements.
198 The author is presently drafting such an amendment to the Federal Rules for
submission to the Federal Rules Committee, a step which could have been easily taken years
ago by the Executive branch. Materials on file with the author. For more views on the future
options of the federal government to assure Article 36 compliance, see generally Schiffman,
supra note 35.
'99 Aceves, supra note195, at 296.
200 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Union Intemationale Des Avocats at 5, Republic of
Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 96-2770).
20' Id. at 2.
202 Id. at 4-5.
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II. THE ATKINS ANALYSIS
Until there is a significant change in the U.S. approach to Vienna Convention
compliance, litigation to compel compliance and remedy its failure will continue.
There are four developments in death penalty jurisprudence and practice which
suggest that a Supreme Court challenge to the failure to provide consular notice is
not only timely but likely to prevail: (1) the Court's analysis in Atkins v. Virginia,
(2) the Court's pending case on the juvenile death penalty, (3) the jury's sentencing
decision in Commonwealth v. Malvo, and (4) the decision of the ICJ in Mexico v.
United States. Additionally, the recognition by a majority of the Supreme Court
that international law is relevant, at the very least, in interpreting constitutional
provisions may be the most critical indicator that this treaty violation must be
deemed to create a right to re-sentencing or a new trial as a matter of due process.
The Court in Atkins v. Virginia declared that the execution of mentally retarded
offenders is cruel and unusual for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. 3 The
petitioner, Daryl Atkins, was convicted for the abduction, armed robbery, and
capital murder of Eric Nesbitt.2 4 The petitioner argued, by way of IQ testing, that
he was mentally retarded and argued that his execution would be a violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights.20 ' The jury concluded, and the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed, that although Atkins may be mildly retarded, this fact did not mitigate
the violent nature of the offense, and sentenced him to death." 6 The United States
Supreme Court remanded the case to the Virginia Supreme Court,2 7 holding that
the execution of mentally retarded offenders is "excessive" and violates the Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment."8
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, focused on several factors
in reaching this outcome. First, the Court discussed the growing national consensus
against executing mentally retarded individuals, shown by new state legislation on
the matter, jury polls, and national opinion polls on society's "evolving standards
of decency."2"6 Second, the Court focused on the effects of mental retardation on
203 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), remanded to 581 S.E.2d 514 (Va. 2003).
204 Id. at 307-08.
205 Specifically, Atkins scored a fifty-nine on an IQ test, where a score of seventy or lower
defines mild mental retardation according to some experts. Id. at 309-10.
206 Atkins v. Commonwealth, 581 S.E.2d 514 (Va. 2003).
207 The Supreme Court did not decide the factual issue of Atkins's mental retardation. The
case was remanded to the Virginia Supreme Court, which directed the Circuit Court for York
County, Virginia, to empanel a new jury for the "sole purpose of making a determination of
[Atkins'] mental retardation.
208 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. Since Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), it has been
established that imposition of the death penalty must be evaluated by both the nature of the
offense and the character and background of the defendant.
" Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-17.
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the understanding of the legal system and on a mentally retarded offender's capacity
to protect successfully his rights.2"0 The Court reasoned that a mentally retarded
offender, while competent to stand trial, has "diminished capacities to understand
and process information, to communicate ... and to understand the reactions of
others., 2 1 ' Although their diminished capacity does not render the offenders
exempt from all criminal sanctions, it does "diminish their personal culpability.
21
Furthermore, the Court found that the death penalty fails to serve a deterrent
purpose in the case of mentally retarded offenders in that most mentally retarded
offenders cannot be deterred by that which they cannot comprehend as a possible
punishment.1 3
Perhaps the Court's most compelling argument in relation to consular
notification is that mentally retarded offenders may be sentenced to death due to
procedural errors that damage the offender's opportunity to mitigate the aggravating
factors required for a death sentence. 214 For instance, the Court points out that
mentally retarded offenders are more likely to give false or coerced confessions, and
may be less able to assist in the defense.215 Furthermore, because such an offender
often cannot process and understand the proceedings, he is more likely to exhibit a
lack of remorse, which juries will take into consideration during sentencing.216
This aspect of the Court's reasoning can easily be extended to the case in which
a foreign national is detained or arrested for a capital offense and is not informed
of the right to have consular assistance. Under Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, at the request of a detained foreign national, the
detaining state has the obligation to inform the national's consulate of his
detainment and, furthermore, has the obligation to allow communication between
the national and the consul. 2 The provision is meant to counteract the unique
difficulties foreign nationals confront upon entering the American legal system. For
instance, foreign nationals may not be fluent in English and have considerable
difficulty understanding complex legal and procedural language. Also, foreign
nationals often may not have a working understanding of our legal system (i.e.,
Miranda rights, implications of statements made after arrest, right to counsel,
etc., as well as general cultural assumptions regarding innocense and guilt), which
may jeopardize their right to a fair trial. Furthermore, foreign nationals are often
without a familial basis of support, and thus are likely to have few people, if any, to
turn to in case of legal troubles and a need for support and information. The
2 0 Id. at 317-21.
21 Id. at 318.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 320.
214 id.
215 id. at 320-21.
216 id.
217 See Vienna Convention, supra note 15.
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combination of these factors creates an aura of chaos surrounding a detained or
arrested foreign national, and inevitably leads to diminished protection of rights
critical from arrest onwards. Article 36 of the Convention protects against these
problems by allowing detained foreign nationals to contact and confer with a
member of their state's consulate." Correspondence with the consulate provides
much needed assistance in the way of language translation, counsel regarding the
American legal process, and finding appropriate legal counsel. Without such
assistance, a detained foreign national is likely to fail to take advantage of the rights
afforded to him/her under U.S. law.
Foreign nationals denied the right to confer with their consulate, at a minimum,
should have the remedy of overturning their death sentences for the same reasons
that mentally retarded offenders cannot be executed under Atkins. The diminished
capacity of mentally retarded offenders is analogous, in that the same confusion and
inability to understand the legal process taking place may be experienced by the
detained foreign national. For example, foreign nationals who do not understand
their Miranda rights would perhaps confess, or be more susceptible to coercive
police investigations.
A detained foreign national may encounter stark cultural differences, for
example, as the Atkins Court noted with mentally retarded offenders,219 foreign
nationals often may not comprehend the death penalty as a possible punishment.
Most foreign nations no longer allow the death penalty as a criminal sentence; as
a result, it is likely that many foreign nationals may not fully appreciate that,
while they could not be put to death in their country for committing a crime, they
would be subject to such a sentence in the United States, and not just in theory.
Again, the Atkins Court's reasoning applies in that "cognitive and behavioral
impairments" rendering a detainee less culpable will "also make it less likely that
they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and,
as a result, control their conduct based upon that information."220 Given the
language and cultural barriers present in the legal system, the specific and general
deterrent purposes that are the cornerstone of criminal punishment are not served.
Similar to the Atkins Court's finding of a national consensus against executing
mentally retarded offenders,' the concept that individuals in a foreign country
should be entitled to access to their consulate upon arrest is firmly rooted in general
notions of due process. The United States signed the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations in 1963, and a foreign national's rights to speak to the consulate
mirror a U.S. citizen's Miranda rights in many ways. There is a fundamental
recognition in our criminal system that no detainee should be forced to undergo
218 id.
219 536 U.S. 304 (2003).
220 Id. at 320.
221 Id. at 314-17.
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investigation without the assistance of counsel, and as a Miranda violation results
in the preclusion of evidence, so should the denial of a foreign national's consular
rights. The dissent in Atkins focused on the lack of proof that there was in fact
a national consensus in favor of prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded
offenders. However, given the international underpinnings of the right to consular
access, its near universal acceptance and longstanding incorporation into U.S. law,
and the consensus that a person arrested in a foreign country has a right to "contact
the embassy," there is an international and national consensus that notice be
provided. The proper redress for a violation of Article 36 must be, at a minimum,
reversal of the death sentence; for it is offensive to the Eighth Amendment and
"evolving standards of decency" to sentence an offender who has neither the
ability to understand the proceedings against him, nor access to those who do.
Inevitably, the Atkins decision led to speculation that the death penalty for
juveniles would be deemed cruel and unusual punishment. As Victor Streib
commented, "the death penalty's Siamese twins [are] juvenile offenders and
mentally retarded offenders. 2  When Kevin Stanford's death penalty case came
before the Supreme Court for a second time in the fall of 2002, four Justices -
Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter - dissented to the denial of certiorari in an
opinion that called for "an end to this shameful practice" of imposing the death
penalty on those under the age of eighteen. 3 The factor on which all nine of the
Justices rely in determining the "standards of decency" dictating what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment is legislation. 24 As discussed in Parts I and IV, the
Vienna Convention, as interpreted in multiple international decisions by which the
United States is bound, requires consular notification not just as a matter of
"decency," but as a matter of fundamental due process.
I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF MALVO FOR THE JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY IN SIMMONS V. ROPER
A comparison of the trials of John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo
demonstrates that jurors, judges and the general public are becoming uncom-
fortable with the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. As has been
noted elsewhere, twenty-two states still allow for imposition of the death penalty
on juveniles, but only two, Texas and Virginia, have sentenced and executed
juveniles since the 1990 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky.225 Moreover, Virginia has
had only one juvenile offender sentenced to death since 2002, and has only one
222 Victor L. Streib, Adolescence, Mental Retardation, and the Death Penalty: The Siren
Call of Atkins v. Virginia, 33 N.M. L. REv. 183, 183 (2003).
223 In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 972 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224 See, e.g.,Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
225 Streib, supra note 222, at 192.
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juvenile offender now on death row.226 Muhammad and Malvo were both charged
with capital murder by the state of Virginia after being linked as principals to the
sniper shootings that took place in the fall of 2002. Although both men were
convicted, only the jurors in the Muhammad trial recommended the death penalty.
Muhammad was charged with the capital murder of Dean Meyers, a Prince
William County resident who was a victim of one of the sniper attacks.227 The state
charged Muhammad under two capital murder statutes,228 one requiring the jury
to find that Muhammad killed more than one person in a three year period,229 the
other requiring the jury to find that Muhammad killed Meyers in the commission
of an act of terrorism.2 31 Muhammad pleaded not guilty to all four charges on
October 14, 2003.231 The following four days were spent selecting a jury, which
resulted in a composition of ten women, five men and only two racial minorities.1
32
Opening statements were set to begin on October 20, 2003.233
Before opening statements began, Muhammad approached the judge with a
request to represent himself."M Muhammad's attorneys, described as some of the
best defense lawyers in Northern Virginia, have over fifty years of combined
226 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion); Streib, supra note 222, at 192.
221 Josh White, Muhammad: 'Not Guilty'; Suspect Publicly Denies Culpability for First
Time, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Suspect Publicly Denies Culpability].
228 Id. The state also charged Muhammad with conspiracy to commit murder and a
firearms violation. Id.
229 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(8) (Michie 2004) (a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of more than one person within a three-year period" constitutes capital murder in the
state of Virginia).
230 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(13) (Michie 2004). The Virginia legislature included the
"willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of any person by another in the commission of
or attempted commission of an act of terrorism" in its capital murder statute after the
September 1 1th attacks. See 2002 Va. Acts ch. 588. Terrorism is defined as "an act of
violence... committed with the intent to (i) intimidate the civilian population at large; or (ii)
influence the conduct or activities of the government of the United States, a state or locality
through intimidation." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.4 (Michie 2004).
231 Suspect Publicly Denies Culpability, supra note 227.
232 Carol Morello & Marcia Slacum Greene, Capital Case Jurors Find Own Beliefs on
Trial: As Ultimate Judgement Looms, Panel Members Confront Personal Doubts, Lawyers'
Queries, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2003, at B 1. All fifteen jury members heard the entire case,
but three were randomly chosen to be excused before the jury began to deliberate on the guilt
of Muhammad. Id.; Josh White, Muhammad's Case Goes to Jury; Malvo's Begins:
Prosecutors Allege Terror Reign; Defense Says There's No Proof, WASH. POST, Nov. 14,
2003, at Al.
23 Josh White, Muhammad Takes Over His Own Defense: Judge Advises Against Move,
Then Allows It, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Muhammad Takes Over
Defense].
234 Josh White, Muhammad Swayed Judge With "I Know Me," WASH. POST, Oct. 21,
2003, at A8 [hereinafter Muhammad Swayed].
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experience."' Muhammad, however, told the judge that he was the best individual
to speak for himself and could adequately represent his case.236 Muhammad's self-
representation only lasted for two days,237 but in that brief time Muhammad gave
an opening statement and cross-examined several of the prosecution's witnesses,
including an expert, a survivor of one the sniper attacks, and a police officer.23
Reporters called Muhammad's days of self-representation "awkward," noting the
discomfort and disapproval of jurors, especially when Muhammad tried to
sympathize with family members of the victims.239 Muhammad's inexperience
also showed, with fewer objections and challenges to evidence than might have
occurred had his attorneys been in control. 24  Muhammad also made some
blunders during his opening statement that could have given the jury the impression
that he was present at the shootings. 24' Yet several commentators suggested that
Muhammad's self-representation was not a sure failure.242 Even the prosecution
was not sure how the jury would react, making sure to tell the jurors in opening
statements not to hold Muhammad's decision against the state.243
Over the next few weeks, the prosecution called 136 witnesses and presented
more than 406 exhibits and 450 pieces of evidence in order to prove that
Muhammad was responsible for the death of Dean Meyers and the fifteen other
sniper attacks. 2! " Survivors of shootings, family members of victims, witnesses
235 Muhammad Takes Over Defense, supra note 233.
236 Muhammad Swayed, supra note 234.
237 Josh White, Muhammad Reinstates Lawyers in Sniper Trial: Witnesses Identify Malvo
as Assailant in 2 Attacks, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2003, at Al.
231 Josh White, Sniper Trial Witness Tells How He Was Shot, Robbed, WASH. POST, Oct.
22, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Sniper Trial Witness]; Muhammad Takes Over Defense, supra
note 233.
239 Sniper Trial Witness, supra note 238 (While cross-examining a witness, Muhammad
said, "I have some questions to ask you, but I'm not asking these questions to disrespect
you.... I understand how you feel when your life is on the line." In response one juror rolled
her eyes and several others looked down.).
240 See Muhammad Takes Over Defense, supra note 233.
241 Id. (Muhammad said, "We know something happened.... They wasn't there. I was.
I know what happened, and I know what didn't happen."). This statement would later be
called the "800 pound gorilla sitting in the court room" by former federal prosecutor Andrew
White. Scott Higham, After Short Case, Defense Prepares to Address Jurors: Brief
Presentation of Five Witnesses Could Backfire on Muhammad's Lawyers, Experts Say,
WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2003, at A18.
242 Anne M. Coughlin, a law professor at the University of Virginia, found Muhammad's
decision to be a "very chancy" move that might relay to the jury that he is either
"humanized" or "even more coldblooded." Sniper Trial Witness, supra note 238.
243 Muhammad Takes Over Defense, supra note 233 (The prosecutor said in his opening
statement, "We have a duty to do, and I hope, and I ask, that none of you hold his decision
to represent himself against us in any way.").
244 Josh White, Muhammad Prosecution Rests: Judge to Rule on Defense Motion for
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to shootings, police officers, an expert on sniper tactics, fingerprint and DNA
experts, individuals testifying to the relationship between Muhammad and
Malvo, and private and crime scene investigators were among the many witnesses
testifying for the prosecution. 45
After the prosecution rested its case on November 10, 2003, Muhammad's
attorneys immediately challenged the applicability of Virginia's death penalty
statute to Muhammad with two motions to dismiss the capital murder charges. 246
The first motion argued that Muhammad was not eligible for the death penalty
because there was no proof that he pulled the trigger or directed Malvo to pull the
trigger.247 The second motion challenged the application of the Virginia death
penalty statute's terrorism provision to Muhammad, contending that it was never
intended to apply to such a case.248 The judge, however, ruled that Muhammad
was eligible for the death penalty because the prosecution produced enough
evidence to show that he could have been a principal in the first degree and the act
was part of a "purposeful series" of events. 249
Dismissal of Capital Charges, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at B 1 [hereinafter Prosecution
Rests]; The Day in Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at B5.
245 See Scott Higham, Slowly Building Pieces into a Whole: In Sniper Trial, Prosecution's
Circumstantial Case Begins to Coalesce, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2003, at Al; The Day in
Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2003, at B4; The Day in Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2003, at
A12; The Prosecution's Circumstantial Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2003, at A8; Josh
White, Sniper Victim's Shock Described: Cabdriver's Slaying at Maryland Gas Station
Detailed at Trial, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2003, at B 1; Josh White, Witnesses Say They Saw,
Reported Caprice, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2003, at B 1.
246 Prosecution Rests, supra note 244.
247 Id.
248 The Day in Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 11,2003, at B5; The Day in Court, WASH. POST,
Nov. 13, 2003, at A18.
249 Josh White, Sniper Suspect Eligible for Death: Judge Won't Require Proof That
Muhammad Fired the Fatal Shot, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2003, at Al. The so-called
"triggerman" rule that the defense argued stems from the Virginia cases Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 255 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1979), and Coppola v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 797
(Va. 1979), which stated that "only the immediate perpetrator of a homicide, the one who
fired the fatal shot, and not an accessory before the fact or a principal in the second degree,
may be convicted of capital murder," 257 S.E.2d at 806. The judge's ruling in the
Muhammad trial was debated by the legal community. William Sullivan, a former assistant
U.S. attorney that has experience in prosecuting, suggested that "[tihere's more than enough
evidence," but Alexandria defense lawyer John Zwerling, suggested the "commonwealth
[was] basically asking this judge to expand the current state of the law to include someone
who may be a puppeteer." Scott Higham, Judge Weighs Muhammad's Eligibility for Death:
Outside Lawyers Divided on Whether Prosecutors Met Two Legal Requirements for
Execution, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2003, at B5. Zwerling's opinion was shared by other
attorneys and law professors who pointed out that the prosecution did not prove that
Muhammad personally killed anyone. Id. An alternative analysis exists, however, for
subjecting Muhammad to the death penalty as the "triggerman." When an individual utilizes
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Muhammad's attorneys presented his defense in three hours, calling only five
witnesses to challenge the prosecution's testimony.5 On November 17, 2003, after
two days of deliberating, the jury found Muhammad guilty of all charges.25' In the
sentencing phase, which began on November 20, 2003, the judge limited the
prosecution's victim impact testimony to evidence relevant to the death of Dean
Meyers, impeding the prosecution's original plan to introduce emotional testi-
mony to at least three shootings. 52 Along with the limited emotional testimony,
the prosecution introduced several pieces of evidence and testimony to show that
Muhammad was a danger to society, such as a map marked with future targets and
testimony from a corrections officer that Muhammad was plotting a prison escape.253
Muhammad's attorneys presented evidence, such as home videos, and called
several witness in an effort to humanize Muhammad. 2 5 The jury began sentencing
deliberations on November 20, 2003.255
After four hours of disagreement on the verdict, the jury asked the judge what
would happen if they did not reach a unanimous verdict and whether they could
deliberate into the next week.2 56 The judge avoided the first question, instead
encouraging them to find a unanimous verdict, but told the jury they could delib-
erate into the following week if needed.257 One jury member also asked if she
could do legal research over the weekend and look at other cases.258 She was told
a legally incompetent person to commit a crime (such as a child or an otherwise illegally
competent person), the individual "puppeteer" is considered the principal in the first degree.
If Malvo were found to be legally incapable of a shooting (due to insanity, or perhaps
duress), Muhammad could be deemed the principal in the first degree. Malvo is, however,
of sufficient age to be held responsible for a crime.
250 Scott Higham, After Short Case, Defense Prepares to Address Jurors, WASH. POST,
Nov. 13, 2003, at A18.
251 Carol Morello, Defendant Stoical Through the End: Muhammad Keeps Emotions to
Himself, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2003, at All.
252 Josh White, Muhammad Guilty on All Counts: Prosecutors Begin Case for Sniper's
Death, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2003, at Al.
253 Josh White, Muhammad Planned More Shootings, Jury Is Told: Prosecutors Seeking
Death Penalty Also Describe Attempted Escape, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2003, at B1. The
Virginia death penalty statute sentencing guidelines require that the jury find a "probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands
charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman." VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004).
2 Josh White, Lawyers Argue Fate of Sniper: Muhammad Jury to Weigh Penalty, WASH.
POST, Nov. 21, 2003, at AI.
255 Josh White, Muhammad Jurors Told to Keep Working: Panel Asks What Happens in
Deadlock, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2003, at B 1.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
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that jurors could not do any outside legal research or seek out any other information
on the death penalty.259 By November 25th the jury was able to come to a consensus
and recommended the death penalty for both capital murder convictions.26°
Interviews with jurors revealed that the jury was initially divided eight-to-four on
whether the death penalty should be imposed and several jurors struggled with
imposing the death penalty.261' The judge followed the recommendation of the jury
and formally sentenced Muhammad to death on March 9, 2004.262
As the prosecution's case in the Muhammad trial was coming to a close, the
trial of Lee Boyd Malvo was just beginning. Malvo was charged with two counts
of capital murder for the death of a different victim, Linda Franklin of Fairfax
County, Virginia. 263 Like Muhammad, Malvo was charged under the multiple
killing and terrorism provisions of the Virginia death penalty statute.264 Malvo also
pleaded not guilty to the charges but, instead of refuting the evidence, he claimed
he was temporarily insane when the sniper shootings occurred.265 Malvo's jury of
nine women and seven men was selected on November 11, 2003, and included a
more racially diverse composition than Muhammad's, with two African-American
men, two African-American women and one Asian man. 66 Opening statements
took place on November 13, 2003,267 and the prosecution began its case on
November 17th.26
259 id.
26 Josh White, Jury Sentences Muhammadto Death: Defendant Stoical, Panel Emotional
as Sniper Trial Ends, WASH. POST, Nov 25, 2003, at Al.
261 Id. See also, Marc Fisher, Flawed Process Produced a Fair Jury, WASH. POST, Nov.
25, 2003, at B 1. One juror asked his fellow jurors in the jury room, "[h]ow many more
bodies do we need to add to this pile we already have?" Id. Another jury member voiced that
she will probably become an anti-capital punishment activist now that the trial is over. Id.
262 Josh White, Defiant Muhammad Sentenced to Deathfor Sniper Slaying, WASH. POST,
Mar. 10, 2003, at Al.
263 Tom Jackman, Malvo Pleads Not Guilty; Jury Process Underway: Muhammad
Subpoenaed to Aid Case, Attorneys Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at BI [hereinafter
Malvo Pleads]. Linda Franklin was shot on October 14, 2002.
264 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(8), (13) (Michie 2004). See Malvo Pleads, supra note 263.
Malvo was also charged with a weapons count. Id.
265 Malvo Pleads, supra note 263.
266 Tom Jackman, In Malvo Trial, Defense Will Focus on "Why": With Jurors Empaneled,
Case Is Ready to Begin, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2003, at BI [hereinafter Focus on Why].
After the guilt phase of the trial the jury was cut down to eight women and four men. Tom
Jackman, Malvo Guilty of Capital Murder: Sniper Trial Jury to Choose Life or Death as
Sentence, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Jury to Choose Life or Death].
267 Henri E. Cauvin, Neither Side Holding Back in Malvo Case: Lawyers Aggressive at
the Start, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2003, at B 1.
268 Tom Jackman, Malvo Jury Won't Hear 911 Call, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,2003, at Al 0.
2004]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Throughout the prosecution's five-day case, over eighty-five witnesses gave
testimony and 240 exhibits were introduced. 269 Among the prosecution's most
influential pieces of evidence were tape-recordings and transcripts of interrogations
of Malvo.27' The interrogations included several incriminating statements by
Malvo declaring that he intended to kill the victims and that he was the one who
fired the shots.27" ' Malvo also told detectives that he and Muhammad planned to
kill individuals until the government either caught them or paid them ten million
dollars.272 Malvo's attorneys claimed that Malvo only gave the statement in order
to protect Muhammad and pointed out several factual errors given by Malvo in
order to discredit his confessions, but the prosecution's evidence was still damaging
to Malvo. 2 3 The prosecution also called several witnesses, such as a jail guard, to
testify that Malvo admitted to them that he killed several others in addition to Linda
Franklin.274 Some of the evidence the prosecution introduced was being used by
the jury in Muhammad's trial, so the jury only saw photographs until the evidence
was available.
275
The defense began presenting Malvo's case on November 24th and rested on
December 15, 2003.276 Over nine and a half days, Malvo's attorneys called forty-
five witnesses and introduced ninety-nine exhibits.277 Witnesses included several
people who knew Malvo at various stages of his life, both in Jamaica and in the
United States.278 Malvo's father and other family members were among the
witnesses, telling the jury that Malvo was an obedient child who was good-natured
before he met Muhammad.2 79 Other witnesses, such as Muhammad's ex-wives and
son, were called to show that turmoil in Muhammad's life led him to commit the
sniper attacks and that he had the ability to manipulate and brainwash Malvo into
269 Tom Jackman, Malvo's Father Recalls 'My Prized Son': Defendant Ignores Crying
Witness, First to Recount His Troubled Past, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2003, at B 1 [hereinafter
Father Recalls]; Malvo Trial: The Day in Court, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at A30.
270 Tom Jackman, Jury Hears Tape of Malvo Interrogation, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2003,
at Al.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Tom Jackman & Patricia Davis, Jail Guard Says Malvo Talked of Trail of Bodies,
WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2003, at A29.
275 Patricia Davis, Malvo Jury Sees Photos, but Not Actual Evidence, WASH. POST, Nov.
24, 2003, at B 1.
276 Father Recalls, supra note 269; Tom Jackrnan, Prosecution Psychologists Say Malvo
Was Not Insane: Both Sides Rest Cases; Closing Arguments Set for Today, WASH. POST,
Dec. 16, 2003, at B1 [hereinafter Prosecution Psychologists].
277 Father Recalls, supra note 269.
278 Malvo Trial: The Day in Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2003, at B5.
279 Tom Jackman, Witnesses Call Malvo 'Obedient'; Defense Relies on Effect of
Muhammad's Influence, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2003, at B 1.
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joining him. 28° Testimony by three mental health experts and an expert on cults
was introduced in an effort to show that Muhammad's indoctrination of Malvo
made him temporarily insane and unable to distinguish right from wrong.
28
'
The prosecution called two mental health rebuttal witnesses over the next
few days, followed by the closing arguments, and by December 17, 2003, the jury
began deliberations.282 The jury took only two days to find Malvo guilty on both
counts of capital murder, but questions late in the first day demonstrated that the
decision was not easy for the jury.283
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution was able to bring in
several pieces of emotional testimony that were not allowed in the guilt phase.2
In contrast to the judge in the Muhammad trial, the Fairfax county judge ruled
that some of the emotional evidence, such as the 911 tape of Linda Franklin's
husband after she was shot, was irrelevant to the guilt phase of the trial.2"5 The
prosecution's case was very emotional to both the witnesses and the jurors.
Reporters noted that over half of the jurors cried while they listened to the testi-
mony of the victims' family members.286 The prosecution also told the jurors of an
escape attempt by Malvo in order to convey that he was a threat to society.2" 7
Malvo's attorneys presented similar testimony in the sentencing phase as they
did in the guilt phase.288 Past teachers, friends, family members and others who
spent time with Malvo before the sniper shootings gave testimony as to why he did
not deserve the death penalty.28 9 After two days of deliberations, the jury imposed
only a life sentence on Malvo.2 °
280 Id. See also Tom Jacknan, Malvo Defense Portrays Muhammad's Turning Point,
WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2003, at B1; Tom Jackman, Muhammad a 'Manipulator': At Malvo
Trial, Sniper's Son Describes Being Influenced, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2003, at Al.
281 Henri E. Cauvin, Mental Health Experts Can Often Tell Defendant's Tale: Malvo 's
Insanity Plea Allows for Hearsay, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2003, at B2; Tom Jacknan, 2
Psychiatrists Testify That Malvo Was Insane: Teen Had Mental Disease, Sniper Jury Told,
WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2003 at B1; Tom Jackman, Disparities in Malvo's Interviews
Questioned, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2003, at B 1.
282 Prosecution Psychologists, supra note 276; Tom Jackman, Malvo 's Case in Hands of
Virginia Jury: Insanity Argued in Sniper Trial, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at Al.
283 Jury to Choose Life or Death, supra note 266.
284 Tom Jackman, Emotions Run High in Malvo Courtroom: Suffering Described in
Penalty Phase, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2003, at Al.
285 Id.
286 id.
287 Malvo Trial Begins Penalty Phase, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2003, at Al 3.
288 Id.
289 Serge F. Kovaleski, High School Educators Praised Malvo: Attorney Introduces
Letters from Teacher, Principal, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2003, at B 1.
290 Tom Jackman, Malvo Is Spared Death Penalty; Jury Gives Teen Life Sentence for His
Role in Sniper Slayings, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Malvo Is Spared].
Malvo was formally sentenced on March 10th. Tom Jackman, Malvo Is Sentenced to Life:
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Although the charges against Malvo were almost identical to the charges
brought against Muhammad, the trial proceedings and outcomes were significantly
different. The prosecution's case against Malvo was arguably stronger than the case
against Muhammad, yet the jury in Malvo's trial did not impose the death penalty.
The prosecution had evidence of Malvo's fingerprints on the alleged murder
weapon 29 and several witnesses saw Malvo at the scenes of various shootings.292
The extensive interrogations of Malvo not only allowed the jury to hear Malvo's
confessions, but gave the jury reasons to doubt that he was insane or childish.2 93 The
jury's reluctance to impose the death penalty on Malvo does not square with the
strength of the prosecution's case. When Malvo's age is brought into the picture,
however, the jury's ability to set aside the confessions and fingerprints to spare
Malvo the death penalty makes sense.29 Malvo's youth was a constant focus
before, during, and after the trial, and proved to have a considerable impact on the
sentencing aspect of the case in particular.
Malvo's youth altered perceptions from the beginning. Before the trial began,
the Washington Post published a lengthy article depicting Malvo as an abandoned
and abused child who had several guardians throughout the years.295 The story
focuses on Malvo's youth and suggests he was indoctrinated into participating in the
sniper charade because of his obedient nature and unstable home life.2 96 Addition-
ally, Malvo' s appearance in the courtroom was that of a young boy. Reporters wrote
that he looked "more like a Gap kid than the remorseless, coldbooded murderer
portrayed by the prosecutors."'2 9 In addition to Malvo's crewneck sweater and
Dockers, the press commented on his "youthful doodling" and childlike demeanor
in the court room. 8 The legal community commented that creating such "empathy
and sympathy with the jurors" who "are parents themselves" was not only a
strategy to prove Malvo's insanity, but also to make the imposition of the death
penalty on Malvo more difficult.29
Teen Convicted in Faiifax May Plead Guilty in OtherSniperAttacks, WASH. POST, Mar. 11,
2004, at Al.
291 Focus on Why, supra note 266.
292 Id.
293 Serge F. Kovaleski, Doodling and Dress Called Defense Ploy: Some See an Effort to
Stress Malvo's Youth, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2003, at B7 [hereinafter Doodling].
294 Henri E. Cauvin, Malvo's Age Was the Deciding Factor, WASH. POST, Dec. 24,2003,
at Al [hereinafter Malvo's Age].
295 Henri E. Cauvin, Malvo 's Restless Journeyfor Belonging and Direction, WASH. POST,
Nov. 9, 2003, at Al.
296 id.
297 Doodling, supra note 293.
298 id.
299 Id. Malvo's attorneys denied that Malvo's appearance was a ploy to make him look
especially young.
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Throughout the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, Malvo's attorneys
continuously focused on Malvo's juvenile-like ways. In most trials, the defendant's
age is not a factor until the sentencing phase, but in this case Malvo's attorneys were
able to bring the issue to the jury in both phases due to the insanity defense.3" In
both the guilt and sentencing phases, the jury heard extensive testimony about
Malvo's troubled youth, and how such abuse, neglect and his age allowed him to
be so easily indoctrinated by Muhammad. 30 1 According to the Chief of Capital
Cases for the Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia, Gerald
Zepking, the inclusion of this evidence from the beginning allowed Malvo's
attorneys to make more of a case to spare Malvo's life than if this evidence had
been introduced to the jury for the first time during the sentencing phase. 2 A law
professor who studies the penalty phase of capital trials commented that during the
penalty phase, "a defendant's youth and impressionability work very much in
their favor. 'A key strategy is to remind the jury that he is somebody's child and
that he could be their child." 30
3
After the trial was complete, several jurors commented on how Malvo's youth
impacted their decision to impose the life sentence. One juror stated that she "didn't
feel [Malvo] would have been in this circumstance but for John Muhammad ' 3°4 and
another found "[h]is background, his age [and] the psychiatric testimony" to be
convincing mitigating factors. 5 Although feelings of both disgust and relief were
felt after the trial, the legal community agreed that Malvo's age was the crucial
factor in the decision." The prosecuting attorney commented that Malvo "is very
lucky that he looks a lot younger than he is. ' '3" Others commented on the impact
of the jury's sentence recommendation, noting that it "sends a strong message to
legislators.., that public opinion is shifting about executing teenagers."30 8 Former
director of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's criminal justice project, George
Kendall, suggests that states might want to rethink spending money on bringing
" Focus on Why, supra note 266. See also Tom Jackman, Muhammad's Case Goes to
Jury; Malvo's Begins: Lawyers Offer 2 Views of Teen: 'Clever Killer' or Obedient Boy,
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2003, at Al.
"' See Malvo Pleads, supra note 263; Focus on Why, supra note 266.
302 Henri E. Cauvin, Malvo Guilty of Capital Murder: At the Core of the Case: Should a
Life be Spared?, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at Al; Jury to Choose Life or Death, supra
note 266.
303 Serge F. Kovaleski, Attorneys Introduce Letters from Malvo Principal, Teacher,
WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2003, at B4 (quoting Welsh S. White, a law professor at the
University of Pittsburgh).
" Malvo Is Spared, supra note 290.
30 Carol Morello, et al., Tormented Jurors Argued, Cried and Wavered Before Agreeing
to Life, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2003, at A9.
3 Malvo 's Age, supra note 294.
3 Malvo Is Spared, supra note 290.
308 Malvo 's Age, supra note 294.
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capital cases against juveniles after this case because it "was a very clear sign that
this country is turning away from using the death penalty generally, but clearly in
cases involving youthful offenders."'
What must now be added to the legislative calculus in the Atkins analysis is the
refusal of a Virginia jury to sentence Lee Boyd Malvo, perhaps the most notorious
juvenile offender in decades, to the death penalty. The circumstances surrounding
his trial and sentencing, whether fornally relevant in all respects to the court's
determination or not, will reinforce the significance of Virginia's failure to execute
a juvenile offender since 2002. The blatant forum-shopping that went on between
prosecutors in Alabama, Maryland, Washington, D.C., Virginia and the federal
government made it apparent that Virginia was selected for the first Malvo trial
because it was the only one of those jurisdictions that had executed juveniles since
1973.310 While in federal custody, Malvo refused to talk to investigators on the
advice of his attorneys. During a seven hour interrogation in Virginia when Malvo
was initially without an attorney, however, he gave a confession, which was
quickly leaked to the press, in which he admitted pulling the trigger in several of
the shootings and even planning some of the killings. Muhammad, in contrast,
never spoke to interrogators, suggesting yet another reason why juvenile offenders
may merit more protection from the death penalty.311 The result of Malvo's trial, in
comparison to Muhammad's trial, also demonstrates that juries are uncomfortable
with imposing the death penalty on juveniles. Although the prosecution in Malvo's
case had both a confession and evidence of Malvo's fingerprints on the alleged
murder weapon, whereas the prosecution in Muhammad's case had to establish that
Muhammad was a principal despite not being the triggerman, only the jury in
Malvo's trial declined to impose the death penalty.
The six Justices in the Atkins majority considered actual jury verdicts and
executions in rejecting the death penalty for mentally retarded individuals, which
not only opens the door to consideration of the jury verdict in Malvo but also to the
39 id.
310 Id. Alabama was the only other forum of those that even allowed for the juvenile death
penalty. Only Virginia and Texas have executed multiple juvenile offenders since 1990 -
Virginia, three; Texas, eleven. Id.; Joseph W. Goodman, Overturning Stanford v. Kentucky:
Lee Boyd Malvo and the Execution of Juvenile Offenders, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REv. 389,
407-08 (2003).
31 See Goodman, supra note 310, at 408-10.
The need for extra constitutional protections for juveniles is
demonstrated in the way that prosecutors purportedly took advantage
of Malvo's youth, vulnerability, and inexperience to gain his
confession.... [and] [t]he difference between Malvo's actions (that is,
his confession) at the hands of prosecutors and Muhammad's actions
(that is, his silence) under similar circumstances highlights the
difference between a juvenile's judgment and an adult's judgment.
Id. at 409-10.
[Vol. 13:363
FROM BREARD TO A TKINS TO MALVO
broader circumstances of the sentencing as reflecting on the third factor of
community considerations in assessing evolving standards of decency.3"2 Even if
Malvo is tried again, in Virginia or Alabama, and sentenced to death, it will continue
to be significant that the initial jury in such a notorious case, in such proximity to
the most extensive and well known of the killings, refused to sentence Malvo to
death. That another jury in virtually the same time period did sentence Muhammad
to death, despite the lack of a confession and substantial questions as to whether he
was the triggerman, provides as much of a control group test of public rejection of
the death penalty for juveniles as can ever be expected.
Prior to the Malvo sentencing, several commentators had made the arguments
for why the Atkins decision should lead to the Court's prohibition of the death
penalty for juveniles. The legal significance of the Malvo verdict and sentencing
under the Atkins factors has been delineated above. The Missouri Supreme Court
ruling in State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper 1 3 is a textbook-like application of the
Atkins factors to imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders, holding that
its imposition is cruel and unusual punishment. After noting that Stanford v.
Kentucky"4 was decided the same day as Penry v. Lynaugh,315 a case overruled by
Atkins, the court's analysis begins by noting that the legislative action against the
juvenile death penalty is evidence that a national consensus now exists against the
death penalty for juvenile offenders. 3 " The decision then proceeds to the actual
imposition of the death penalty, emphasizing that more mentally retarded offenders
have been executed, and in more states, since 1977 than juvenile offenders.3"" In
considering the views of respected organizations, the court also found,
that the views of the international community have consistently
grown in opposition to the death penalty for juveniles. Article
37(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child and several other international treaties and agreements
expressly prohibit the practice. According to Amnesty Interna-
tional, officially sanctioned executions of juveniles have
occurred in only two other countries in the world in the last few
years, Iran and the Republic of Congo (DRC). Of the last seven
juvenile offender executions, five occurred in the United
States.31 '
312 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002).
313 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1171 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2004) (No.
03-633).
314 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
315 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
316 Roper, 112 S.W.3d at 397, 407-09.
317 Id. at 410.
318 Id. at 411 (citations omitted).
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This reference to an international consensus is limited to the Atkins factor regarding
the views of respected organizations. The court does not even address the signif-
icant and substantial issue under international law and constitutional law as to
whether the United States may continue to execute juveniles despite this over-
whelming consensus.
The prohibition on the execution of juveniles is not merely a rule of customary
international law - it is jus cogens, a customary norm of such overwhelming
consensus and fundamental importance that there may be no derogation from it
(recognition of jus cogens norms as absolute is itself a norm of customary
international law). Despite the contention of some commentators that custom
should not be deemed part of federal law on par with treaties and congressional
legislation under the Supremacy Clause, no federal court, to date, has so held and
there are many federal court decisions (including those of the Supreme Court, most
recently in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain319 ) that have recognized custom as directly
incorporated federal law. Customary international law prohibits juvenile exe-
cutions and the norm is jus cogens. This norm is absolute, and is federal law under
the Supremacy Clause which as a matter of constitutional law prevails over any
conflicting state law. International law and the Supremacy Clause provide a
separate, constitutional basis for the invalidation of the death penalty for juveniles.
Proceeding on to the fourth Atkins factor, the court's "independent examination"
of the death penalty for juvenile offenders, the Simmons court found no retributive
or deterrent value to the execution of juveniles, in part because of their lesser
experience and education compared to adults. In addition, the court concluded that
the risk of wrongful execution is greater for younger offenders "who have had less
time to develop ties to the community, less time to perform mitigating good works,
and less time to develop a stable work history... and who are far more likely than
adults to waive their rights and to give false confessions.3 20
It has been suggested in this symposium by defenders of the death penalty for
juveniles that the jury's refusal to impose the death penalty on Malvo demonstrates
that juries can make meaningful distinctions between the legal culpability of
juvenile offenders. The above analysis suggests otherwise, as did the prosecutor in
Malvo's case. When asked in multiple interviews after the sentencing what he had
learned from the case, the prosecutor replied that he had learned never to bring a
death penalty case in the week before Christmas.32 '
319 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
320 Id. at 413.
321 Tom Jackson, Jury Gives Malvo Life Sentence in Sniper Case, WASH. POST, Dec. 24,
2003, at A8.
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IV. "REVIEW AND RECONSIDERATION" OF THE DEATH PENALTY
AFTER MEXICO V. UNITED STATES
On March 31, 2004, the ICJ ruled that the United States once again breached
its obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention 322 by not advising
Mexican nationals, arrested and sentenced to death in the United States, of their
right to communicate with Mexican consular officers.323 Article 36(1)(b) requires
state authorities to inform detained foreign nationals "without delay" of their right
to communicate with consular officers. 324 Based on the object and purpose of the
Vienna Convention, the ICJ interpreted the phrase "without delay" as meaning "as
soon as [the authorities] realize[] that the person is a foreign national, or once there
are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national. 325
The United States' failure to inform foreign nationals of their right to request
consular notification led to other violations of Article 36. Of the fifty-one Mexican
nationals not properly informed of their right to communicate with their consular
officers, the United States failed to formally notify Mexican consular officers with
respect to the detainment of forty-nine Mexican nationals, as prescribed by Article
322 Vienna Convention, supra note 15. Article 36(1)(a) states "consular officers shall be
free to communicate with [their respective] nationals.., and to have access to them." Article
36(l)(b) requires state authorities to inform "without delay" detained foreign nationals of
their right to communicate with consular officers, and if requested, state authorities must
contact respective consular officers. Also, any communication from the detained national
must be forwarded to consular officers. Id. Article 36(l)(c) states "consular officers shall
have the right to visit a [detained] national" to communicate and "arrange for his legal
representation," unless the detained national opposes such action. Finally, Article 36(2)
asserts that the rights in paragraph (1) "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and
regulations" of the State detaining the foreign national, except "that the said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under [Article 36] are intended." Id.
323 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128
(Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm. Mexico originally
named fifty-four Mexican nationals on death row in its application, but later amended it to
exclude two Mexican nationals after further investigation. Id. at para. 7. The ICJ found fifty-
one Mexican nationals were not properly informed of their right to request consular
notification. Id. at para. 106(1). Shortly after Mexico filed its application in January 2003,
the ICJ issued a provisional order, as requested by Mexico, that the United States not execute
three Mexican nationals, whose appeals were exhausted, pending the ICJ's final judgment.
Id. (Feb. 5,2003 provisional order granting Mexico's request for the indication of provisional
measures).
324 See supra note 322.
325 Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, para. 88. Mexico argued "without delay" meant immediately
after arrest and before interrogation. See id. at para. 78. The United States argued the term
meant "as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances." See id. at para. 81.
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36(l)(b).326 This prevented Mexican consular officers from freely communicating
with Mexican nationals, as required by Article 36(1)(a), and visiting Mexican
nationals while detained, as required by Article 36(1)(C). 317 In the cases of thirty-
four Mexican nationals, consular officers were prevented from properly arranging
legal representation as allowed by Article 36(1)(c). 32
Mexico argued that Article 36(1) violations by the United States are often
precluded from being raised in United States criminal appeals courts because of the
procedural default rule,329 and this procedural bar was counter to Article 36(2)
requiring "full effect" to be given to purposes of the rights accorded in Article 36
and the ICJ's decision in LaGrand.330 The United States responded that judicial
and executive clemency proceedings together give full effect to Article 36 and
comply with the LaGrand requirements.3 Even though the procedural default
rule precludes raising breaches of Article 36(1) when not raised at the trial level,
such breaches are later considered under executive clemency proceedings. 332 The
ICJ agreed with Mexico that the procedural default rule was being applied counter
to the "full effect" requirement under Article 36(2), but it concluded that an Article
36(2) violation occurred, and LaGrand applied only when judicial review was
completely exhausted.333 In three cases the judicial process was completed;
therefore, the United States was in breach of Article 36(2) in the cases of three
Mexican nationals.334
The ICJ then addressed the appropriate legal remedy for the breaches made
by the United States. Mexico's requests that the convictions and death sentences
imposed be immediately annulled, and that evidence obtained in breach of Article
36 be excluded in any future proceedings against the Mexican nationals, were
326 Id. at para. 106(2). No violation was found in two cases because one Mexican national
chose not to have consular officers notified after being informed of his right "40 hours after
his arrest," and another Mexican national was not informed of his right, but state authorities
did formally notify consular officers. See id. at paras. 93, 97.
327 Id. at para. 106(3).
328 Id. at para. 106(4).
329 Id. at para. 11. The procedural default rule is defined as "a defendant who could have
raised, but fails to raise, a legal issue at trial will generally not be permitted to raise it in
future proceedings, on appeal or in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Id.
330 Id. at paras. 107, 109. See supra note 322, for the text of Article 36(2). See also
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
331 Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, para. 110, available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/
idocket/imus/imusframe.htm.
332 Id.
333 Id. at para. 113.
31 Id. at para. 114. These three Mexican nationals were the same individuals subject to
the ICJ provisional order prohibiting their executions while the ICJ's final judgment was
pending, issued in February 2003 shortly after Mexico submitted its application. See id. at
para. 3.
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denied by the ICJ as intrusive in the U.S. criminal justice system and not supported
by the object and purpose of the Vienna Convention.3 ' Failure to inform foreign
nationals of their right to request consular notification, and further breaches
stemming from that failure, was the violation of the Vienna Convention, not the
convictions and sentences themselves. 3 36 The ICJ held that the United States
must, as required by LaGrand and Article 36(2), "by means of its own choosing,
[provide] review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the
Mexican nationals ... by taking account" of the violations of Article 36.33' The
review and reconsideration should be a "judicial process, 38 and the "clemency
process, as currently practised within the United States criminal justice system,
does not appear to meet the requirements" of review and reconsideration and "is
therefore not sufficient.- 339 Lastly, the procedural default rule should not act as a
bar to raising Vienna Convention violations "where it... is the failure of the United
States itself to inform [of the right to request consular notification] that may have
precluded counsel from being in a position to have raised the... violation... in the
initial trial."' In such cases review and reconsideration by U.S. criminal appeals
courts is prevented.34' Under these guidelines the United States must proceed to
review and reconsider the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals by
taking into account its violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.
As Mark Warren noted in his article, the ICJ's growing frustration with the
United States' non-compliance with the Convention was even more evident in
Avena.342 In Avena, the provisional order demanded that the United States "shall
take all measures necessary to ensure" that the specific individuals would not be
executed before the Court's final judgment on the merits.
... Id. at paras. 116-27. The requested actions by Mexico "ha[ve] to be examined under
the concrete circumstances of each case by the United States courts concerned in their
process of review and reconsideration." Id. at para. 127.
336 Id. at para. 123.
337 Id. at para. 153(9).
338 Id. at para. 140.
311 Id. at para. 143. The United States unsuccessfully argued a combination of judicial
review and executive clemency proceedings.
31 Id. at para. 113.
341 Id. The United States unsuccessfully argued it had complied with LaGrand through its
good faith efforts of notifying and training law enforcement agencies of the consular rights
of foreign nationals under the Vienna Convention. Id. at para. 145. The ICJ appreciated these
"noteworthy" efforts, but they were not sufficient. See id. at paras. 147, 152.
342 Warren, supra note 162, at 329-31.
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V. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION THAT "INTERNATIONAL LAW IS PART OF OUR
LAW, AND TO BE ASCERTAINED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE COURTS
34 3
One other, more general, development in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
suggests that international norms will be considered more fully in the pending
juvenile death penalty case of Simmons when the Supreme Court decides the case
on its merits. Four Justices - Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer - said in
opposition to the denial of certiorari in Stanford H that execution of juveniles must
end.3 " Justices Kennedy and O'Connor joined these four in the Atkins opinion.45
In the dissimilar cases of Atkins, Grutter v. Bollinger,2
6 and Lawrence v. Texas,37
both of these Justices took into consideration (as did the Missouri Supreme Court
in Simmons) norms of customary international law in interpreting constitutional
provisions. As several other articles in this symposium demonstrate, customary
international law prohibits execution of juveniles.
In Bollinger, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg discussed the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, a treaty
ratified by the United States, as support for the Court's observation that affirmative
action programs "must have a logical end point. ' 3 8s The Supreme Court has also
considered foreign precedent when discussing the right to engage in sodomy in the
privacy of one's own home, the history of assisted-suicide law, the application of
the Eighth Amendment to the death penalty, and the conflict between campaign
finance laws and the First Amendment.349 In the last five years, Justices Stevens,
Breyer, and Kennedy have cited foreign decisions as support in their opinions, and
Justice O'Connor has publicly endorsed increased reliance on both international
law and foreign court decisions.
Approximately fifty House Republicans have entered the judicial fray by
proposing a non-binding resolution that judicial decisions may not be based on
foreign laws or court decisions, transparently in response to liberalization of the
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
3" In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 968-69 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14' Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
3- 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
347 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
34' Harold Hongju Koh, The United States Constitution and International Law:
International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 49 (2004) (quoting Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 309, 342, 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
349 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (sodomy); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
403 (2000) (First Amendment); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 718 n.16,
785-87 (1997) (assisted suicide); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (assisted
suicide); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (Eighth Amendment).
350 Koh, supra note 348, at 48.
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law in death penalty and gay rights cases.35' The two co-sponsoring members of
the House Judiciary Committee, Bob Goodlatte of Virginia and Tom Feeney of
Florida, suggested that impeachment may even be an appropriate remedy for
judges utilizing foreign law to interpret the Constitution.352 It is unclear whether
the resolution would also preclude reliance on British colonial precedents or other
sources of Anglo-American law, which even Justices Thomas, Scalia and Rehnquist
have used without questioning their validity in constitutional interpretation.353
As the amicus brief of legal historians filed in the case of Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain354 demonstrates unequivocally, customary international law was assumed
by the Framers, the first Congresses, and the earliest American courts to be part of
our federal law.355 Treaties are expressly in the Constitution as the "supreme law of
the land., 356 Congress is given the additional power "[t]o define and punish piracies
and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations." '357
When Articles m and VI of the Constitution speak of the "Laws of the United
States," the drafting history of those provisions demonstrates that the phrase
encompassed customary international law on par with federally created law.35
Incorporation of international law into constitutional interpretation is consistent
with the original intent of the Framers, whatever non-binding resolutions,
"nationalist" Justices, and the current administration might otherwise suggest.
International norms have been utilized by the Court since 1780 to protect and
expand upon established civil liberties. They have not, and could not, be utilized to
reduce established constitutional rights or to establish new ones without any
other constitutional foundation. Nothing less than a constitutional amendment
would be necessary to isolate the U.S. Constitution from the influence of interna-
351 See H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004). A similar resolution, H.R. Res. 446, 108th
Cong. (2003), was also introduced in the 108th Congress.
352 Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court: House Members
Protest Use of Non-U.S. Rulings in Big Cases, MSNBC, Mar. 11, 2004, at
http://www.house.gov/feeney/msnbsresolutionarticle.htm.
3" The broader of the two resolutions provides:
[that it is] the sense of the House of Representatives that Judicial
determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the United States
should not be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign
institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements
inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the
United States.
H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004).
314 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
... Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Alvarez-Machain (No. 03-339).
356 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
357 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
358 Koh, supra note 348, at 44 & n.5.
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tional norms in derogation of the Framers' original intent and the express language
of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court cannot avoid the internationalization of domestic law, as the
five prominent international law cases on its docket this past term demonstrate.359
Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who Koh refers to as the
"nationalist Justices," 36° have been the most resistant to the utilization of foreign
law and international law.36' Justice Thomas has said "this Court... should not
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans. 362 Justice Scalia declared
"irrelevant" what other countries thought about the execution of the mentally
impaired. 63 Their "notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our
people." 36 Chief Justice Rehnquist has joined in opinions and dissents by Thomas
and Scalia finding international law irrelevant, 365 but joined with Scalia in citing the
judicial approval in Canada of homosexual marriage in his dissent in Lawrence v.
Texas.3"6 Moreover, as Koh points out, Rehnquist has stated:
When many new constitutional courts were created after the
Second World War, these courts naturally looked to decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States, among other sources,
for developing their own law. But now that constitutional law
is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the
United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other
constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.367
... See Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: The United States Constitution
and International Law: Editor's Introduction, 98 AM. J. INT'LL. 42,42 n.3 (2004). The five
cases are: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981
(U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 352 F.3d 695 (2nd Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2004) (No. 03-1027); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp.
55 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-334); Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 807 (U.S. Dec.
1, 2003) (No. 03-339); and State ex rel Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003),
cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1171 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2004) (No. 03-633).
"o Koh, supra note 348 at 52 & n.62, 54.
361 Id.
362 Id. at 52 n.66 (quoting Thomas's concurrence in denial of certiorari in Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002)).
363 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
364 Id.
365 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Atkins, 536 U.S. 304,337-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324-25 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
31 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
367 Koh, supra note 348, at 48 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts -
Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT
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The force and effect of international law, against the death penalty for juveniles
and the lack of established procedural remedies for failure to provide consular
notice, has reached a level of consensus and precedent that even the nationalist
Justices can no longer ignore (even if only to reject its application by the other
Justices). It is time, as the Chief Justice has said, for the Supreme Court to look to
the constitutional courts of other countries to aid in our constitutional interpretation.
Four Justices and the Missouri Supreme Court have already done so, concluding that
the death penalty for juveniles is cruel and unusual punishment. Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor have indicated their willingness to consider international norms, and
these norms unequivocally prohibit it. If Chief Justice Rehnquist does what he says
it is time to do, he would have to reach the same conclusion. As compelling as the
case may be now for the Supreme Court to prohibit the death penalty for juveniles
in Simmons, the case for mandatory re-sentencing or retrial for defendants who did
not receive consular notice is equally or more compelling, even for the "nationalist"
Justices, if due recognition is to be given to treaty obligations which are the
"Supreme law of the land," and ICJ decisions by which the United States is bound.
CONCLUSION
The United States has acknowledged, and the ICJ has held, that the failure to
provide consular notice is a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. Treaties are the "supreme law of the land" under the Supremacy
Clause.3 68 Decisions of the ICJ are binding on the parties to the case under the UN
Charter to which the United States is a party.3 69 Whatever strained ambiguities the
United States might seek to find in the ICJ's Avena opinion, it unequivocally stands
for the proposition that there must be judicial review and reconsideration of the
death sentence for any foreign national who did not receive consular notice. The
possibility of executive clemency does not suffice.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has determined that Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention confers individual rights of notification on foreign detainees
at the time of arrest, and that any death sentence imposed without such notice
violates fundamental due process guarantees and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation
of the right to life.37 As Mark Warren's article notes, the UN General Assembly
AND FUTURE - A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P.
Kommers eds., 1993)).
368 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
369 U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1.
370 See The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Oct. 1, 1999, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 16 (1999).
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has endorsed by consensus the opinion of the Inter-American Court that failure to
provide consular notice violates fundamental guarantees of due process.37 '
Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention requires that "laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under the
article are intended." The United States contends that it has done everything it can
do in our federal system to ensure that notice is given and that judicial remedies are
provided. That is simply not the case.
Efforts are currently underway to see that rules four and five of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure are amended to require consular notice in federal
arrests.372 This initiative has not been taken by or at the request of the U.S.
government, even though the United States has a treaty obligation under the Vienna
Convention to ensure that laws and regulations (at a minimum federal laws and
regulations) give effect to the consular notice requirement.
In sum, Avena stands without question for the proposition that ajudicial remedy
must be provided to individual defendants for the failure to provide consular notice,
and that decision is binding on the United States under the UN Charter, a treaty to
which the United States is a party and which is the "supreme law of the land" under
the Supremacy Clause. Therefore, U.S. courts can no longer take the position that
the Vienna Convention does not create individual rights, or that a judicial remedy
is not required. The Avena decision specifies that the remedy must include "review
and reconsideration" of a death penalty case, and that the possibility of executive
clemency does not suffice.373
Avena must be read with the decision of the Inter-American Court that failure
to provide consular notice in death penalty cases violates fundamental due process
guarantees and is an arbitrary deprivation of life. The United States is a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which includes the
protection of the rights to life and due process in its provisions. 4 The State
Department's contention that the decision of the Inter-American Court has no force
and effect because it is not charged with interpreting the Vienna Convention is
disingenuous to say the least. The Court is responsible for interpreting the Charter
of the Organization of American States (OAS), to which the United States is a
party, which includes the protection of due process and the right to life, as does the
ICCPR. In short, the Inter-American Court has said that the OAS Charter and the
ICCPR, both of which are binding treaties on the United States, are violated by the
failure to provide consular notice before imposition of the death penalty and
171 Warren, supra note 162.
372 See supra note 198.
... See supra Part V.
... International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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implicate due process.375 The Inter-American Court is the preeminent authority for
legal interpretation of the OAS Charter. 76 It has given the ultimate, internationally
authoritative interpretation of the OAS Charter with respect to the failure to provide
consular notice, and concluded that it violates due process and is an arbitrary
deprivation of the right to life. It is not the ultimate authority for interpreting the
ICCPR (the UN Committee on the ICCPR is) but its interpretation of the ICCPR is
entitled to substantial deference at the very least.
When the failure to provide consular notice reaches the Supreme Court, the
essential question will be the remedy for this acknowledged treaty violation. The
Avena decision is binding on the United States under the Supremacy Clause, and
requires "review and reconsideration" in the form of a judicial remedy.377 In the
April 2004 annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, Justice
Scalia even remarked that "foreign" law is legitimately utilized in domestic courts
to "interpret a treaty to which the U.S. is a party" or to construe federal law to avoid
conflict with "foreign" law.378 He also acknowledged, in response to a question
from Professor Doug Cassell, that ICJ decisions that are binding on the United
States are very different in terms of applicability than foreign law generally. 79 In
addition, to the extent that U.S. courts have refused to exclude confessions because
the right to consular notice is not on par with constitutional violations, Avena and
the Inter-American Court decisions demonstrate that the failure to provide notice is
in fact a deprivation of due process under international treaties to which the United
States is a party, and at the very least our constitutional requirements of due process
should be interpreted consistently with the holdings of these decisions and to require
no less notice than our treaty obligations of due process.
Finally, judicial prohibition of the death penalty when there has been a failure
of consular notice is consistent with the Atkins analysis and considerations which led
to its prohibition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded. A Supreme Court
determination that a failure to provide consular notice would necessarily require re-
sentencing, and in most cases retrial, would fulfill both U.S. obligations (notice and
providing an adequate remedy) under the Vienna Convention and bring much
needed consistency to death penalty jurisprudence with respect to the mentally
... See The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Oct. 1, 1999, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 16 (1999).
376 See American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Josd, Costa Rica," opened
for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 114 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force Aug. 27, 1979).
"' See supra Part V.
378 Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law
Annual Meeting (Apr. 2, 2004).
379 Id.
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retarded, juveniles, and foreign nationals. Our own Constitution and treaty
obligations require as much.
380
... As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case
involving denial of consular rights to a Mexican national. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 686
(2004). Medellin had appealed the Texas district court's denial of his habeas petition
asserting that his counsel was ineffective, he was not informed of his right of consular access,
and that he had not been provided exculpatory material. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit had little difficulty rejecting the petitioner's non-Vienna Convention claims. Medellin
v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004).
The court of appeals also concluded that the petitioner's Vienna Convention claim was
defaulted, and even if it were not procedurally defaulted, the Convention, "as interpreted by
this Court in the past, does not confer an individually enforceable right." Id. at 279
(emphasis added). The tone of this portion of the court's opinion, however, can only be
characterized as a reluctant outcome necessitated by prior domestic court precedent, which
has been superseded by binding international law precedents. For example with respect to
procedural default, the court stated:
The Supreme Court, prior to the Avena and LaGrand decisions,
however, ruled that Vienna Convention claims, like Constitutional
claims, can be procedurally defaulted, even in a death penalty case.
Though Avena and LaGrand were decided after Breard, and contradict
Breard, we may not disregard the Supreme Court's clear holding that
ordinarily procedural rules can bar Vienna Convention claims.
Id. at 280 (citation omitted). Similarly, with respect to consular notice as an individual right,
the court concluded:
A prior panel of this Court, however, held that Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention does not create an individually enforceable right.
... We are bound to apply this holding, the subsequent decision in
LaGrand notwithstanding, until either the Court sitting en banc or the
Supreme Court say otherwise.
Id.
There is an interesting contrast between this opinion on consular notice and the opinion
of the Missouri Supreme Court on the juvenile death penalty in Simmons v. Roper. In both
cases the lower courts concluded that prior Supreme Court decisions have been superseded
by current international law precedents. In Medellin, the court reluctantly followed Supreme
Court precedent; in Simmons, the court refuses to do so. From an international law
perspective and constitutional law perspective under Article III, both courts were not only
entitled, but required to reject prior precedent - in Medellin based on the subsequent
binding decisions of the ICJ, and in Simmons based on the jus cogens norm of customary
international law prohibiting execution of juveniles.
416 [Vol. 13:363
